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Consuming (F)ears of Corn: Public
Health and Biopharming
Rebecca M. Bratspies t
I'm convinced that physical containment is overrated and, while reassuring to
the psyche, is hardly the line of defense one would like to put the greatest reliance
upon. I
So what you have to keep asking yourself is: Suppose the worst happens, what
are the consequences?2
I. INTRODUCTION
We have entered the biotech century. Advances in biotechnology are already
transforming medicine, agriculture, and industry in ways undreamt of thirty years
t Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law. I would like to thank B. Allen Schulz for his
feedback and support, Greg Jaffe of Center for Science in the Public Interest for generously providing
me with information, and Dean Phil Peters from the University of Missouri College of Law-Columbia
for suggesting the project to me. I would also like to thank Jane Edwards, Kathy Prince, and their
research staff for invaluable research assistance.
I Letter from Dr. Paul Berg, Chair of the National Institutes of Health Advisory Committee
Concerning Recombinant DNA Technology, to Dewitt Stetten; see also MICHAEL ROGERS,
BIOHAZARD 151 (1977) (reflecting on the relaxed adherence to safety protocols for biotechnology
research).
2 Michael Specter, The Pharmageddon Riddle, NEW YORKER, Apr. 10, 2000, at 58, 67
(quoting Robert B. Shapiro, former Chief Executive Officer and Chair of Monsanto, Inc.).
3 Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity defines biotechnology as "any
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms or derivatives thereof to make
or modify products or processes for specific use." CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, art. 2,
USE OF TERMS, at http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp?lg=0&a=cbd-02 (last updated Dec.
6, 2003). The United States defines biotechnology as "the use of modern scientific techniques,
including genetic engineering, to improve or modify plants, animals, and microorganisms." U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT BIOTECHNOLOGY, at http://
usinfo.state.gov/ei/economicissues/biotechnology/biotechfaq.html (last visited June 26, 2004). The
U.S. State Department and the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") also provide useful
glossaries of biotechnology. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GLOSSARY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
TERMS, at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0903/ijee/glossary.htm (last visited June 26, 2004);
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, HARMONY BETWEEN
AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CURRENT ISSUES, at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Emphases/
Harmony/issues/genengcrops/terms.htm (last updated July 9, 2002). The USDA site also refers users
to the more complete the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization Glossary of
Biotechnology for Food and Agriculture which defines biopharming as "[tihe use of genetically
transformed crop plants and livestock animals to produce valuable compounds, especially
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ago, and the pace of scientific advances can only be expected to accelerate. Just as
the industrial revolution completely transformed the era of craft and guild
production, the world that biotechnology produces may be all but unrecognizable
from today's vantage point.4
One of the most controversial and exciting prospects of biotechnology is
biopharming-a process in which plants are genetically modified so that they
endogenously produce specialty pharmaceutical or industrial proteins. 5 Many such
crops are currently being planted in small test plots throughout the country.6 Once
they are fully developed and approved, these biopharm crops will be grown in the
same agricultural fields that are currently devoted to producing traditional
agricultural crops. 7
Biopharm companies envision a lucrative future in which agricultural fields,
converted into biofactories, grow the raw materials for industrial or pharmaceutical
production. Among the dazzling possibilities are plants that produce specialty
industrial compounds like biodegradable plastics 8 and polyesters;9 or drugs to treat a
variety of human diseases, such as cancer, HIV, and Alzheimer's.'0 The allure of
these crops is clear-an environmentally sustainable 1 and inexpensive replacement
for costly drugs and petrochemicals. 12
pharmaceuticals." A. ZAID ET AL., GLOSSARY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE-A
REVISED AND AUGMENTED EDITION OF THE GLOSSARY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC
ENGINEERING (2001), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/Y2775E/y2775e07.htm#bmO7.1.
The biotechnologies discussed in this article are all rooted in insights developed through molecular
biology and genetics.
4 See Chris R. Somerville & Daroi Bonetta, Plants as Factories for Technical Materials, 125
PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 168 (2001).
5 Biopharming involves inserting novel genes into crop plants, like corn, in order to make the
plants manufacture proteins that may be used as drugs, vaccines, enzymes, antibodies, hormones, or
industrial chemicals. Essentially biopharming converts plants into a living factory for chemical or
pharmaceutical production. Although biopharming uses food crops as its production vehicle, biopharm
crops are not food and are not intended for human consumption. See STATE PIRGs, STATE PIRGs'
CAMPAIGN ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, at http://pirg.org/ge/GE.aspid2=10570&id3=ge&
(last visited June 26, 2004).
6 See ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, USDA, BIOTECHNOLOGY
REGULATORY SERVICES, CURRENT STATUS OF RELEASE PERMITS, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/
status/relday.html (last visited July 23, 2004) (listing test plots all around the country.)
7 There are generally three types of biobased products in various stages of planning or
production: commodity chemicals (e.g., ethanol or oil-based inks), specialty chemicals (e.g.,
pharmaceuticals and plastics), and materials (e.g., wood and paper). Biobased commodity and
materials production will largely be outside the scope of this article because the various proposals
being floated do not typically involve plants bioengineered to express novel, non-food compounds.
8 Henry Daniell, Environmentally Friendly Approaches to Genetic Engineering, 35 IN VITRO
CELLULAR DEV. BIOLOGY-PLANT 361, 361 (1999) (citing other sources).
9 Somerville & Bonetta, supra note 4, at 169; Christine Nawrath et al., Targeting the
Polyhydroxy-butyrate Biosythetic Pathways to the Plastids of Arabidopsis Thaliana Results in High
Levels of Polymer Accumulation, 91 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12760 (1994).
10 COMMITTEE ON BIOBASED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
BIOBASED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS: RESEARCH AND COMMERCIALIZATION PRIORITIES (2000).
11 Farming already raises a host of environmental issues, many of which are addressed by
existing environmental laws, albeit poorly. For example, factories must comply with environmental
statutes, including the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). However, environmental harms, such as
agricultural run-off, are not regulated under the CWA. Biopharm crops will require tremendous inputs
of fertilizer and pesticides, and runoff will likely introduce toxins and pollutants into the environment.
12 Biopharming may reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. See, e.g., Melvin Calvin, New
Sources for Fuels and Materials, 219 SCIENCE 24 (1983) (speculating that gene transfer could be used
to develop new fuels). For current developments in biofuels and bioenergy, see OFFICE OF ENERGY
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At the same time, there are some jarring points of tension, if not outright
contradiction, between widespread planting of biopharm crops and the ongoing
expectation of a safe and secure food supply.' 3 Biopharming frequently uses corn
and other food crops as production vehicles, but these crops are emphatically not
food and are not intended for human consumption. 4 Biopharm crops, therefore,
pose "a wholly different order" of environmental and human health risks.' 5 Despite
the unique risks, biopharm crops have been tested in fields across the country under
the same laissez-faire standards used for first-generation genetically modified
("GM") crops-with minimal and poorly enforced safety precautions based on
physical containment. 16  In the last decade, biotech companies and research
universities have violated even those minimal safety precautions more than a
hundred times. 17  Because many of these open-air field tests of experimental
biopharm crops take place in the Corn Belt, these violations put the food supply at a
high risk for contamination. 18
Contamination of food crops with non-food, biopharm compounds is a serious
threat to human safety and could result in rapid dissemination of non-food
pharmaceutical or industrial compounds through the world food supply. There is no
room for trial and error. Once contamination occurs, it will be next to impossible to
reverse this process and "uncontaminate" the food supply. 19  Unfortunately,
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, BIOFUELS FOR SUSTAINABLE
TRANSPORTATION, at http://www.ott.doe.gov/biofuels/ (last updated May 14, 2004).
13 See Memorandum for the President's Council on Food Safety, Aug. 25, 1998, available at
http://www.foodsafety.gov/-dms/fs-whl3.html (describing national expectations of food safety). This
article focuses on human health questions raised by the likelihood of commingling biopharm crops
with conventional crops destined for use as food or feed. The ethical considerations, additional human
health implications and environmental effects of biopharming, while significant, are beyond the scope
of this Article.
14 COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH COMMERCIALIZATION OF
TRANSGENIC PLANTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC
PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION 246 (2002) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS].
15 Id.
16 For a description of some of these requirements, see Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of
Care: Regulation, Uncertainty and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297,
310-14 (2002); see also GREGORY N. MANDEL, GAPS, INEXPERIENCE, INCONSISTENCIES, AND
OVERLAPS: CRISIS IN THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED PLANTS AND ANIMALS, available
at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=418221 (June 19, 2003).
17 APHIS, USDA, BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATORY SERVICES, COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/compliance.html (last visited June 26, 2004).
Although the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") characterizes this as a low
number of violations, and therefore a success story, others are far less sanguine about the conclusions
to be drawn from this number. See, e.g., THE PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY,
ACADEMIA/INDUSTRY VIOLATED USDA RULES, at http://pewagbiotech.org/buzz/display.php3?
StorylD=114 (last visited June 26, 2004).
18 Indeed, in 2002, the Office of Science and Technology Policy acknowledged the
significance of this risk. For proposed federal actions to update field test requirements for
biotechnology derived plants and to establish early food safety assessments for new proteins produced
by such plants, see 67 Fed. Reg. 50,578, 50,587 (Aug. 2, 2002) ("As the number and diversity of field
tests increase, the likelihood that cross-pollination due to pollen drift from field tests to commercial
fields and commingling of seeds produced under field tests with commercial seeds or grain may also
increase. This could result in intermittent, low-levels of biotechnology-derived genes, and gene
products occurring in commerce that have not gone through all applicable regulatory reviews.").
19 In the context of first-generation genetically modified ("GM") crops, industry trade groups
acknowledge that cross-pollination, adventitious commingling, and other "causes" make it virtually
impossible to assure that any U.S. corn shipment is 100% non-GM. See VALUE ENHANCED GRAIN
(VEG) SOLUTIONS, COMMENTARY: INTRODUCING VEG TO THE WORLD BIOTECH CONTROVERSY, at
http://www.vegrains.org/cgi-bin/english/Commentary%200802.cfm (Aug. 22, 2002). Over and above
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important safety issues have been sidelined in order to facilitate rapid growth of this
nascent industry. First and foremost, readily available and far safer alternatives
could be used instead of food crops for biopharm production. But, because market
forces diverge from the public's interest on this point, those safer options have not
been pursued. Without government action forcing innovation towards achieving
public health ends, it is clear that these options will remain unexplored. At the very
least, there should be a moratorium on field testing these crops until a host of health-
related questions are answered. Among the most pressing questions are: Do
biopharm residues bioaccumulate?20  Is there a threshold below which these
compounds can be safely consumed? Are there low-level, long-term health effects?
Are these compounds allergens 21 or toxins? 22  Are biopharmed crops anti-
nutrients?23 How persistent are these compounds in the soil? How toxic are they to
wildlife? How likely is the prospect that these non-food compounds could be spread
to wild relatives?2 4
any human health impacts, biopharm contamination of the food supply will likely have dramatic
ramifications for the U.S. share of the global commodities market. Id.
20 For this reason, opponents of biopharming refer to the practice as pharmageddon. See, e.g.,
MAE-WAN HO, INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE IN SOCIETY, PHARMAGEDDON, at http://www.i-sis.org.uk/
Pharmageddon.php (Dec. 2, 2002). Although this characterization is sensational, even those scientists
closely affiliated with biopharm companies acknowledge that precautionary measures should be taken
when biopharmaceuticals are likely to persist in the environment or bioaccumulate. See, e.g., Henry
Daniell et al., Medical Molecular Farming: Production ofAntibodies, Biopharmaceuticals and Edible
Vaccines in Plants, 6 TRENDS PLANT SCI. 219 (2001).
21 An allergic reaction is an abnormal response of the body's immune system to an otherwise
safe compound. Some reactions are life threatening, such as anaphylactic shock. Some of the
biopharm products currently under development have been engineered to produce trypsin. See, e.g.,
U.S. Patent No. 6,087,558 (issued July I1, 2000) (claiming invention of a transgenic plant that
produces trypsinogen-a precursor of trypsin). Trypsin has a history of eliciting allergic responses in
exposed populations. For allergy information, see Harvey R. Colten et al., Immediate Hypersensitivity
to Hog Trypsin Resulting from Industrial Exposure, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1050 (1975); Peter R.
Shewry et al., Plant Protein Families and Their Relationships to Food Allergy, 30 BIOCHEMICAL SOC.
TRANSACTIONS 906 (2002) (identifying trypsin as an allergen). The poster child for inadvertent
creation of allergenic products through genetic engineering involved the experimental transfer of a
Brazil nut protein to soybeans. See Julie A. Nordlee et al., Identification of a Brazil-nut Allergen in
Transgenic Soybeans, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 688 (1996).
22 A toxic reaction in humans is a response to a poisonous substance. Unlike allergic
reactions, all humans are subject to toxic reactions. The Codex Alimentarius considers evaluations of
allergenicity, toxicity, and anti-nutrient potential to be integral components of any food safety risk
assessment process. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, CODEX
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON FOODS DERIVED FROM BIOTECHNOLOGY, at ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/
standard/en/CodexTextsBiotechFoods.pdf (last visited June 26, 2004).
23 Anti-nutrients are naturally occurring compounds that interfere with absorption of
important nutrients in digestion. For example, avidin, the first commercialized biopharm crop has a
well-known ability to interfere with vitamin B absorption. U.S. Patent No. 5,767,379 (issued June 16,
1998) (claiming invention of a transgenic plant that produces avidin); see also MARK H. BEERS ET
AL., MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY, sec. I, ch. 3 (17th ed., John Wiley & Sons 1999),
available at http://www.merck.com/mrkshared/mmanual/section i /chapter3/3o.jsp; Gianni Bregola et
al., Biotin Deficiency Facilitates Kindling Hyperexcitability in Rats, 7 NEUROLOGICAL REPORT 1745
(1996) (inducing biotin deficiency by controlling avidin consumption); Claudia J. Carey & James G.
Morris, Biotin Deficiency in the Cat and the Effect on Hepatic Propionyl CoA Carboxylase, 107 J.
NUTRITION 330 (1977); Donald M. Mock et al., Marginal Biotin Deficiency Is Teratogenic in ICR
Mice, 133 J. NUTRITION 2519 (2003); Toshiaki Watanabe, Dietary Biotin Deficiency Affects
Reproductive Function and Prenatal Development in Hamsters, 123 J. NUTRITION 2101 (1993).
24 In November 2003, a coalition of public interest groups filed suit in Hawaii District Court
requesting an injunction barring future biopharm field tests until these questions are answered. Center
for Food Safety v. Veneman, No. 03-1-1509 (D. Haw. Nov. 12, 2003), at http://64.78.7.168/pubs/
ComplaintHawaii I .12.2003.pdf.
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Unfortunately, under the U.S. fractured regulatory system, there is no way to
pose these questions with regard to biopharm crops, let alone to answer them. Part
of the problem is that no regulatory agency has a clear statutory mandate to regulate
biopharming. 25 As a result, there are no coherent overarching government 2 policies
capable of ensuring that this new technology is safely explored and exploited.2
The crisis is on our doorstep. According to some predictions, at least 10% of
U.S. agricultural lands will be devoted to biopharming by the end of the decade.27
Thousands of inedible and potentially harmful compounds may soon be grown in
corn fields throughout the country. Without detailed and enforceable standards for
responsible use of this new technology, it is inevitable that these biopharm crops will
contaminate crops destined for use as human food.28  The health risks from
consuming these adulterated foods could be considerable.
Nevertheless, industry and governmental regulators have failed to impose
obvious biological controls that would greatly protect the public's safety, while still
permitting exploitation of this technology. For example, biopharming ought not be
done in food crops, or, at the very least, ought not be released into the open
environment of an agricultural field (as opposed to being grown in a greenhouse)
before basic research has demonstrated that there will be no negative health effects
from consuming contaminated foods.29  Instead of adopting these sensible
precautions, regulators have simply assumed that contamination can be avoided
through use of physical containment measures. This wildly optimistic assumption is
not shared by biopharm developers who admit that biopharm proteins will likely
25 See infra Part II.B.
26 Even Biotechnology Industry Organization ("BIO"), an industry trade and lobbying group,
concedes that there is no United States policy on industrial biotechnology. See BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, EXTERNAL RESOURCES, at www.bio.org/ind/links.asp (last visited June 26,
2004) (identifying four key publications that "represent, as close as you will find, a U.S. policy on
industrial biotechnology"). In 2003, APHIS published interim guidelines for industrial biotechnology.
Introductions of Plants Genetically Engineered to Produce Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,434
(Aug. 6, 2003). For the first time, these new regulations require that any such introductions be
pursuant to a permit. At least 10 industrial biopharm field tests had already been conducted under a
less stringent notification procedure. Id. at 46,435.
27 See, e.g., Scott Kilman, Food, Biotech Industries Feud: Crops Bred to Produce Medicines
Raise Contamination Worries, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2002, at B7; Aaron Zitner, Fields of Gene
Factories, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2001, at Al; Biomass R&D Technical Advisory Committee, VISION
FOR BIOENERGY & BIOBASED PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at http://www.bioproducts-
bioenergy.gov/pdfs/BioVision_03_Web.pdf (Oct. 2002).
28 Indeed, in 2003, USDA found that about 20% of farmers growing existing genetically
modified ("GM") crops failed to comply with planting regulations intended to prevent contamination
of conventional crops. Emily Gersema, USDA Survey Shows Biotech Rules Breaches, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Sept. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 63460812. Given these high levels of non-compliance
with existing requirements and relaxed regulatory oversight, there is no reason to believe that farmers'
behavior will be any different with regard to biopharm crops. In addition, evidence of contamination
is mounting. For example, after just two years of Canadian cultivation, GM canola has cross-
pollinated so extensively that a new, triply herbicide resistant, feral canola has emerged. JIM ORSEN,
GENE STACKING IN HERBICIDE TOLERANT OILSEED RAPE: LESSONS FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE, ENGLISH NATURE RESEARCH REPORTS NO. 443 (2002), available at http://www.english-
nature.org.uk/pubs/publication/PDF/enrr443.pdf. In light of these findings, any regulatory decisions
about these crops must assume that commingling will occur.
29 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was advised to test transgenic plants
producing pharmaceutical compounds for their biological effects at dietary concentrations which, at a
minimum, will likely be encountered in the transgenic plant itself. See FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY
PANEL, MAMMALIAN TOXICITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES FOR PROTEIN PLANT PESTICIDES, SAP
REPORT NO. 2000-03B (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/oscpmont/sap/2000/index.htm. USDA
does not require any such testing before permitting biopharm crops to be field-tested.
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wind up in the food supply. Moreover, physical containment measures have not
shown much success in existing GM crops. 30
The limited scope of existing biopharm regulation leaves the public unprotected
and exposed to an unacceptable level of risk. Moreover, the mere threat of
commingling may be enough to destroy the United States' multi-billion dollar export
trade in corn and other commodities. 31 These failures to address the problem of
contamination and commingling become even more critical now that the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety has entered into force.32 Article 10 of the Protocol gives states
the power to refuse import of the products of biotechnology (called living modified
organisms or LMOs in the Protocol) in order to avoid or minimize adverse effects on
human health or the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 33 It is
hard to imagine anything more likely to justify a refusal to import under the
Cartagena Protocol than undetectable commingling of industrial or pharmaceutical
crops containing non-food proteins with export food crops. Protecting the public's
interest in this context will require government to assume a far more active role than
the hands-off attitude that has been the hallmark of conventional agricultural policy.
This Article raises a few of the more pressing public health questions that
should be resolved before substantial portions of the nation's crop land are diverted
from food production to biopharming. Part II provides an introduction to
biopharming and outlines the various plans and projections for its commercial
exploitation. Part III examines the existing regulatory structure, highlights some of
its most critical weaknesses, and points out the serious risks this structure creates
vis-dt-vis the integrity of the food supply. Part IV articulates a central conclusion
that safe and successful exploitation of these new technologies will demand a
markedly different regulatory regime than the laissez-faire system that has prevailed
in conventional agricultural policy. To that end, the final Part proposes some
alternatives that would better safeguard public health while still permitting
exploration of this exciting new technology.
30 Physical containment measures involve using planting distances or timing to prevent
contamination of conventional crops with GM crops. Unfortunately, for existing GM crops, physical
contamination measures have largely been ineffectual, either because the requirements are too lenient
or because they are not being implemented. Indeed, a 2003 USDA survey found that about 20% of
farms growing GM crops failed to comply with planting regulations intended to ensure physical
containment. Gersema, supra note 28.
31 There is a zero tolerance level for unapproved genetically modified organisms. Corn is the
largest U.S. crop, typically between 9-10 billion bushels annually. See CORN REFINERS ASSOCIATION,
U.S. CORN PRODUCTION: 1999-2001, at http://www.corn.org/web/uscprod.htm (last visited June 26,
2004). Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, and Minnesota alone produce more than 50% of the U.S. corn crop.
U.S. GRAINS COUNCIL, WORLD CORN PRODUCTION AND TRADE, at http://www.grains.org/grains/
corn.html (last visited June 26, 2004). Other major corn-producing states include Indiana, Wisconsin,
South Dakota, Michigan, Missouri, Kansas, Ohio, and Kentucky. Id. In 2000, the United States grew
43% of the world's corn and is the single largest corn exporter, providing 64% of corn sold in the
international corn market. Id.
32 The text of the CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY is available at http://
www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp (last visited June 26, 2004). The Protocol entered into force on
September 11, 2003 following the fiftieth ratification, by Palau. There are currently sixty members of
the Protocol, including the European Union and other significant U.S. trading partners like Mexico.
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY, STATUS OF RATIFICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE, Sept. 11,
2003, available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts=rtf&ord=dt.
33 CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY, supra note 32, at art. 10.
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II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO BIOTECHNOLOGY
Over centuries and millennia, humans have domesticated modified food crops in
order to improve their agronomic and nutritional characteristics. For most of human
agronomic history, this was a process of trial and error. Although it was clear that
desirable agronomic traits could be inherited, there was no way to predict the
outcome of a cross between any two particular plants. In 1865, an Augustinian
monk named Gregor Mendel changed all that. Working with pea plants, Mendel
deduced that offspring inherited traits from their parents in predictable patterns. His
paper, Versuche fiber Pflanzen-Hybriden ("Experiments in Plant Hybridization"), 34
concluded that "heritable factors" (genes or alleles) come in pairs; segregate
independently; and are governed by principles of dominance and recessiveness.
Although the paper initially went unnoticed in scientific circles, these patterns of
inheritance are now referred to as the Mendelian laws of genetics.
Armed with an understanding of Mendel's work, plant and animal breeders
transformed agriculture. By systematically crossing and recrossing individuals with
desirable characteristics, breeders were able to create new varieties that were more
productive and easier to grow.35
Almost a century later, James Watson and Francis Crick's 1953 paper, A
Structure for Deoxyribonucleic Acids, described the structure of DNA-the
molecule responsible for Mendelian inheritance. 36  This paper is generally
considered to have ushered in the era of molecular genetics. 37 The discovery of the
chemical structure of DNA opened up new vistas in biological and biochemical
research.38
By the early 1970's, Stanley Cohen and Hubert Boyer had built on Watson and
Crick's work by successfully splicing a gene from one organism and moving it into
another-the first use of recombinant DNA technology. 39  Suddenly researchers
could move genes from one species to another, thus overcoming the reproductive
34 For either the original text or an English translation, see ROGER B. BLUMBERG, TABLE OF
CONTENTS FOR MENDEL'S PAPER AT MENDELWEB, at http://www.mendelweb.org/MWpaptoc.html
(last visited June 26, 2004).
35 For an excellent introduction to the basics of genetics from Mendel to modern
biotechnology intended for high school students, see DNA FROM THE BEGINNING, at
http://www.dnaftb.org/dnaftb/ (last visited July 16, 2004). For further information on Mendel's role in
modern genetics, geared to non-scientists, see MARANTZ HENIG, THE MONK IN THE GARDEN: THE
LOST AND FOUND GENIUS OF GREGOR MENDEL, THE FATHER OF GENETICS (2000); MATT RIDLEY,
GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS (2000).
36 J. D. Watson & F. H. C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953). Watson and Crick were awarded the 1962 Nobel
Prize for this discovery. For a first-hand, and somewhat scandalous account of this discovery, see
JAMES WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE STRUCTURE
OF DNA (1968).
37 No discussion of molecular genetics is complete without an acknowledgement of this
groundbreaking work. See, e.g., Barbara R. Jasny & Leslie Roberts, Building on the DNA Revolution:
Introduction, 300 SCIENCE 277 (2003) (stating that "[i]mages of Watson and Crick personified molecular
biology to the general public in a way that has never been equaled"); Elizabeth Pennisi, Building on the DNA
Revolution: A Hothouse of Molecular Biology, 300 SCIENCE 278 (2003) (discussing the work of Watson and
Crick and later molecular genetics at the Laboratory of Molecular Biology at the University of Cambridge).
38 See, e.g., Elizabeth Pennisi, Building on the DNA Revolution: DNA 's Cast of Thousands, 300
SCIENCE 282 (2003) (discussing the landmark research on DNA and the genetic code after Watson and
Crick).
39 See, e.g., Stanley N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial
Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3240 (1973).
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limits imposed by sexual incompatibility among species. 40  Recognizing the perils
potentially associated with their new technique, Cohen and Boyer attempted to
41exercise some control over its uses.
Cohen and Boyer's concerns about the potential hazards of these new
techniques mirrored similar concerns that other researchers were expressing. 42 In
light of the as-yet-unassessed, but potentially harmful, consequences of this new
research, the scientific community called for a voluntary moratorium on genetic
engineering.43 At a 1975 conference held at Asilomar Conference Center in Pine
Grove, California, 150 scientists from around the world met to hammer out a set of
safety precautions for genetic research. 44 Known as the Asilomar Consensus
Statement, the conference recommended lifting the self-imposed moratorium and
replacing it with guidelines for genetic engineering research. 45  The central
assumption behind the consensus statement was that the unknown hazards of genetic
engineering should be contained biologically and physically. 46  This consensus
formed the basis for the Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines issued by the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH") in 1976. 47
Until 1984, these guidelines, which applied to researchers funded by NIH,
governed approval of DNA research. A successful legal challenge to decisions made
under those guidelines forced the Reagan Administration to develop a more
overarching regulatory policy to guide federal decision-making about biotechnology
research and its products.48  To that end, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy issued the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. 49 The
40 See id. at 3244.
41 Stanley N. Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, 233 SCi. AM. 25, 32 (1975).
42 See, e.g., Maxine Singer & Dieter Stoll, Letter: Guidelines for DNA Hybrid Molecules, 181
SCIENCE 1114 (1974).
43 Paul Berg et al., Letter: Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185
SCIENCE 303 (1974).
44 For a recent account of that historic meeting, see Marcia Barinaga, Asilomar Revisited:
Lessons for Today?, 287 SCIENCE 1584, 1585 (2000).
45 Paul Berg et al., Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188 SCIENCE 991,
991 (1975) (". . . the evaluation of potential biohazards has proved to be extremely difficult. It is this
ignorance that has compelled us to conclude that it would be wise to exercise considerable caution in
performing this research.") [hereinafter Berg et al., Asilomar Conference]. For an interesting account
of the self-regulatory project, see Judith P. Swazey et al., Risks and Benefits, Rights and
Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 10 19
(1978).
46 Berg et al., Asilomar Conference, supra note 45, at 991; see also Paul Berg et al., Summary
Statement of the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 72 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI.
U.S. 1981, 1982 (1975) [hereinafter Berg et al., Summary Statement].
47 See Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,903 (July 7, 1976).
The guidelines, as updated, are still applicable to research funded by the National Institutes of Health
("NIH") or conducted at NIH and compliance with the guidelines is a condition for continued NIH
funding. The 1976 guidelines prohibited six types of rDNA experiments until more could be learned,
allowed other rDNA experiments to proceed only under strict safety standards, required the physical
or biological containment of rDNA recombinants in the laboratory, and prohibited the deliberate
release of rDNA organisms into the outside environment until more could be learned. Peer review was
the primary means to ensure that these guidelines were carried out. Id. at 27,902-21.
48 Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing the
evolution of the guidelines and upholding an injunction barring deliberate release of a genetically
modified organism known as "ice-minus" until NIH completed an adequate environmental impact
statement).
49 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26,
1986).
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Framework purported to describe the comprehensive federal regulatory policy for
ensuring the safety of biotechnology research and products. 50  The Framework
announced that no new laws would be needed to respond to challenges posed by this
new technology.5' Instead, products of biotechnology would be regulated under
existing laws based on their intended use; thus, food would be regulated under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,52 pesticides under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 53 agricultural plants under the Plant Protection
Act,54 and so on. One unfortunate consequence of this reliance on existing law has
been an erosion, over time, of the commitment to biological containment measures.
During the 1980s, researchers developed bioengineering methods to integrate
foreign DNA permanently into plant genomes, enabling the production of transgenic
plants expressing a wide variety of foreign genes.56  In a process called
transformation, 57 genes coding for a specific trait can be isolated from any organism
and inserted into the embryos of any food crop.58 The transformed embryos are then
grown into adult plants that express the newly added trait. Through bioengineering,
researchers have been able to manipulate plants in unprecedented fashions and to
sequence a series of plant genomes.59 Information gleaned from this new technology
opened up immense possibilities for agriculture and began the rapid cascade of
scientific progress that I call "the ag-biotech revolution."
The first bioengineered, or GM crops were commercialized in 1996. By 2001
U.S. farmers were devoting approximately 88 million acres to GM crops60 -the
50 For a thorough description of the Framework and its development, see D. L. Uchtmann,
StarLinkTM-A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159
(2002).
51 Id. at 169.
52 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2000).
53 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 121 et seq. (2000).
54 Plant Protection Act ("PPA"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701 et seq. (2000).
55 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302 (June 26,
1986).
56 Jozef St. Schell, Transgenic Plants as Tools to Study the Molecular Organization of Plant
Genes, 237 SCIENCE 1176, 1176-83 (1987).
57 There are three primary means to transform, or genetically modify, plants. The most
common takes advantage of the unique properties of Agrobacterium tumefaciens, a soil bacteria that
infects plants by transferring a plasmid of its own DNA into the target plant. By modifying the genes
contained in this plasmid, A. tumefaciens infection can be a means to deliver desirable genes into
plant cells instead of the bacteria's own infective genes, which cause Crown Gall disease. Because A.
tumefaciens is a known plant pest, these transformations fall neatly within USDA's regulatory
authority as outlined in the PPA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772. By contrast, USDA authority over the other
primary methods of transforming plants, the "biolistics" or "gene gun" method and electroporation are
less clear. These are the various techniques that I will refer to as genetic engineering, bioengineering,
genetic modification, or biotechnology.
58 For a lay description of this process, complete with pictures, see, PARTNERSHIP FOR PLANT
GENOMICS EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, PLANT TRANSFORMATION, at http://
ceprap.ucdavis.edu/Transformation/transforml .htm (last updated Apr. 29, 2003).
59 There are plant DNA libraries for more than thirty important crops. U.S. NATIONAL
AGRICULTURE LIBRARY, USDA, PLANT DNA LIBRARY, at http:// www.nal.usda.gov/pgdic/dnalibr/
(last visited June 26, 2004). There are almost one hundred plant DNA mapping projects around the
world. U.S. NATIONAL AGRICULTURE LIBRARY, USDA, PLANT GENOME MAPPING PROJECTS, at
http://www.nal.usda.gov/pgdic/Mapproj/ (last visited June 26, 2004). In 2000, the entire Arabidopsis
genome (a plant widely used as a model plant organism) was sequenced. THE ARABIDOPSIS
INFORMATION RESOURCE, at http://www.arabidopsis.org/ (last updated Mar. 30, 2004).
60 Proposed Federal Actions to Update Field Test Requirements for Biotechnology Derived
Plants and to Establish Early Food Safety Assessments for New Proteins Produced by Such Plants, 67
Fed. Reg. at 50,587 (Aug. 2, 2002).
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lion's share of the 130 million GM acres planted worldwide. 61 In 2003, 73% of the
cotton, 81% of the soybeans, and 40% of the corn planted in the United States were
GM varieties.62  Biotech research has grown at an even more explosive rate. In
1994, approximately 7,000 acres in the United States were planted with 593 biotech
field tests; in 2001, there were 57,000 experimental acres planted with 1,117 field
tests. 63 While most of these were field tests of first-generation GM crops (those
engineered for herbicide resistance or to produce endogenous pesticides), some 300
64were biopharm crops.
A. BIOPHARMING 101
During the 1990s, researchers around the world embarked on the most ambitious
biotechnology project ever-the sequencing of the human genome.65  The Human
Genome Project 66 and related biomedical research spawned a generation of highly
specialized drugs based on antigens (vaccines), recombinant proteins (biologics) and
human antibodies (collectively "therapeutics"). 67  Demand for therapeutics is
growing rapidly, especially those designed for chronic illnesses like psoriasis,
allergic asthma, and rheumatoid arthritis. 68 Meeting the projected demand for these
therapeutics will require thousands of kilograms of purified proteins. 69
Commercial production of these products currently relies on abiotic
fermentation (primarily in E. coli or yeast) or on mammalian cell culture (primarily
in Chinese hamster ovary cells ("CHO cells")). 70  These expression systems have
some serious drawbacks: they tend to be expensive, labor intensive, and they
produce relatively low yields that fall short of supplying all patients in need.
Generally, recombinant mammalian systems can produce about 1-4 grams of a
therapeutic protein per liter of media every 2-3 weeks, 7 1 while recombinant E. coli
systems yield 1-4 grams per liter every 1-2 days.72 Recombinant monoclonal
antibody culture in CHO cells yields .5-1 gram per liter per day, and mammalian cell
61 Id The increases are most dramatic in the United States, but Canada, Argentina, and China
have also experienced significant growth in the development and use of biotechnology-derived crops.
62 See ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA, ADOPTION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
CROPS IN THE U.S., at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ adoption.htm (last updated Sept.
10, 2003).
63 See 67 Fed. Reg. at 50,587.
64 See BILL FREESE, MANUFACTURNG DRUGS AND CHEMICALS IN CROPS: BIOPHARMING
POSES NEw THREATS TO CONSUMERS, FARMERS, FOOD COMPANIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002),
available at http://www.foe.org/safefoods/BIOPHARMFACTSHEET.doc. Between 1989 and July
2003, APHIS considered 170 permit applications-162 permits were issued, 7 were withdrawn, and I
is still pending. No applications were denied.
65 A complete sequence of the human genome was announced in April 2003. NATIONAL
HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE, at http://www.genome.gov (last visited June 26, 2004).
66 For information about the human genome project, see OFFICE OF SCIENCE, DOE,
BIOLOGICAL & ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, at http://
www.science.doe.gov/ober/hugtop.html (last visited June 26, 2004).
67 Id.
68 Stephan Herrera, Protein Therapy Could Heal Agbio, RED HERRING, Sept. 15, 2001,
available at http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/interviews/protein-therapy.html.
69 Id
70 See C.L. Cramer et al., Transgenic Plants for Therapeutic Proteins: Linking Upstream and
Downstream Strategies, 240 CURR. TOP. MICROBIOL. IMMUNOL. 95 (1999).
71 All of the production figures in this paragraph come from RONALD A. RADER,
BIOPHARMA: BIOPHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS IN THE U.S. MARKET 17 (2d ed. 2003).
72 Id.
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perfusion bioreactor systems yield about .3 gram per liter each day. 3 Biopharming
represents the cutting edge of the research on increasing yields with at least 120
different research institutions currently developing a staggering array of biopharm
products.74
At least in theory, plants can be engineered to express high levels of the desired
pharmaceutical protein. 75  One 200-acre biopharm field could therefore produce
significantly greater quantities of therapeutics than current methods. Moreover,
biopharm crops offer some other distinct advantages for producing pharmaceutical
proteins. Large-scale biopharming of these compounds should be more economical
than current production techniques that rely on mammalian cell cultures. Because
biopharming can be done by ordinary farmers in ordinary fields, rather than by
highly skilled workers in high-tech facilities, the capital investment costs are
relatively low. 76 Some estimates indicate that biopharming could reduce production
costs for these therapeutics by an order of magnitude.77 Biopharming can also draw
on a wealth of existing agronomic experience with growing, harvesting and
processing these crops in their conventional forms. Unlike CHO cell or E. coli
production techniques, biopharming does not require a highly educated and tech-
savvy workforce. Biopharmed therapeutics may also be safer than those produced
via existing techniques, because plant-produced therapeutics have a reduced risk of
carrying human pathogens.7 8
The range of possible biopharm products under development is truly
staggering. 79  For example, researchers at the Washington State University have
transformed barley so that it produces cxl-antitrypsin, a human blood plasma protein
used to treat cystic fibrosis and various skin diseases. 80  Barley has also been
transformed to produce Antithrombin III, a human anticoagulant.81 There has been a
great deal of research on antibody production in biopharm plants, so-called
73 Id.
74 Introductions of Plants Genetically Engineered to Produce Industrial Compounds, Interim
Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,434 (Aug. 6, 2003) (indicating that roughly half of the entities are private
companies and half are research institutes).
75 For example, avidin is expressed at 1.5-3% of total soluble protein in corn seeds. Elizabeth
E. Hood et al., Commercial Production of Avidin from Transgenic Maize: Characterization of
Transformant, Production, Processing, Extraction and Purification, 3 MOLECULAR BREEDING 291,
292 (1997). Chloroplast transformation could potentially increase that yield by an order of magnitude.
See Daniell, supra note 8.
76 Stephen J. Streatfield et al., Plant-based Vaccines: Unique Advantages, 19 VACCINE 2742
(2001); Takeshi Arakawa et al., Expression of Cholera Toxin B Subunit Oligomers in Transgenic
Potato Plants, 6 TRANSGENIC RESEARCH 403, 412 (1997) (describing biopharming as safer and more
cost effective).
77 FREESE, supra note 64; see also James W. Larrick et al., Production of Secretory IgA
Antibodies in Plants, 18 BIOMOLECULAR ENGINEERING 87, 90, 92 (2001).
78 For a description of the state of the industry, and a detailed assessment of the advantages of
plant-based production of therapeutics, see Cramer, supra note 70.
79 Id. at 97 (putting forth a partial list of biopharm products under development).
80 See Henriette Horvath et al., The Production of Recombinant Proteins in Transgenic Barley
Grains, 97 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 1914 (2000). For a detailed description of the
transformation, see Diter von Wettstein, Application for Permit #00-334-01R Renewal under 7 C.F.R.
§ 340 (Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with author). Currently this protein is available in limited supply from
human blood plasma. If biopharming successfully increases the supply, "-antitrypsin could be used to
treat a wide range of disorders more effectively. Id. at 5.
81 von Wettstein, supra note 80, at 5.
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"plantibodies, ' ' 82 and various research teams have demonstrated the possibilities of
growing biovaccines against infectious diseases like cholera,83 hepatitis B, 84
Norwalk virus,85 and traveler's diarrhea. 86 Pre-clinical trials for these biovaccines
have demonstrated that plant-grown vaccines can be effective in humans. 87
Researchers at ProdiGene and Epicyte have transformed corn to produce human
monoclonal antibodies to treat HIV, 88 and herpes simplex,89 and a team at Cornell
has developed individualized biovaccines to treat non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. 90
ProdiGene currently biopharms avidin corn for use as a research grade chemical,9 1
and Epicyte has developed a corn-grown spermicidal plantibody that it hopes to
market as a contraceptive. 92
Although biopharm research has been conducted on a wide variety of plant
species, corn has become the crop of choice for biopharm companies looking to
commercialize their products.93 Indeed, the number of corn field tests dwarfs
experimentation in all other crops combined.94 Corn does offer a number of
advantages-particularly the utility of corn cobs as a pre-packaged, cheap, and
easily transported storage system. Unfortunately, this use of corn raises some
serious safety questions because of the likelihood of contaminating the food supply.
Corn is, after all, a promiscuously outcrossing, wind-pollinated plant.95 Although
82 Daniell et al., supra note 20, at 221, fig. I (2001) (describing current human and
mammalian trials of these plantibodies).
83 Arakawa et al., supra note 76.
84 Jozef Kapusta et al., A Plant-derived Edible Vaccine Against Hepatitis B Virus, 13 FASEB
J. 1796 (1999).
85 Carol 0. Tacket et al., Human Immune Responses to a Novel Norwalk Virus Vaccine
Delivered in Transgenic Potatoes-Concise Communication, 182 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 302, 302-05
(2000).
86 Carol 0. Tacket et al., Immunogenicity in Humans of a Recombinant Bacterial Antigen
Delivered in a Transgenic Potato, 4 NATURE MED. 607 (1998).
87 Id.; Kapusta et al., supra note 84. For a discussion of another experiment with a biovaccine,
see Anna Modelska et al., Immunization Against Rabies With Plant-Derived Antigen, 95 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 2481 (1998).
88 See BIOEXCHANGE, EPICYTE PHARMACEUTICAL ADVANCES PRODUCTION OF HUMAN HIV
ANTIBODIES IN PLANTS (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.bioexchange.com/news/news_
page.cfmid=16071; see generally Biolex, Inc., at http://www.biolex.com (Biolex, Inc. acquired
Epicyte Pharmaceutical Inc.).
89 Larry Zeitlin et al., A Humanized Monoclonal Antibody Produced in Transgenic Plants for
Immunoprotection of the Vagina Against Genital Herpes, 16 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1361 (1998).
90 Alison A. McCormick et al., Rapid Production of Specific Vaccines for Lymphoma by
Expression of the Tumor-derived Single-chain Fv Epitopes in Tobacco Plants, 96 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
ScI. U.S. 703 (1999).
91 Elizabeth E. Hood, et al, Commercial Production of avidin from transgenic maize:
characterization of transformant, production, processing, extraction and purification, 3 MOLECULAR
BREEDING 291-306 (1997).
92 See Topical Application of Antibodies for Contraception and for Prophylaxis Against
Sexually Transmitted Diseases, U.S. Patent No. 6,355,235 (issued Mar. 12, 2002) (describing the
antibodies as extremely effective in small doses), available at http://www.pharmcast.com/Patents/
040400OG/6045786 sexuallyTranO4O400.htm.
93 See FREESE, supra note 64.
94 Id. (reporting that 134 of USDA's 198 biopharm field trial notifications or permits were for
corn).
95 For an explanation of corn's reproductive behavior, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, PESTICIDE FACT SHEET: BACILLUS THURINGIENSIS SUBSPECIES CRYI F PROTEIN AND THE
GENETIC MATERIAL NECESSARY FOR ITS PRODUCTION (PLASMID INSERT PHI 8999) IN CORN, at
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/ingredients/ factsheets/factsheet_006481 .pdf (last visited
July 23, 2004).
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companies routinely claim that test site locations are confidential business
information ("CBIr), 96 rendering that information unavailable to the public, much of
this testing apparently occurred in the Corn Belt.97
B. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS BIOPHARMING
Biopharming is an integral part of President Bush's energy policy and
associated initiatives and was strongly supported by President Clinton before him.98
In 2000, Congress passed the Biomass Research and Development Act,99 which
created an interagency Biomass Research and Development Board and a Biomass
Research and Development Technical Advisory Committee. 00  In 2002, the
Advisory Committee published a National Vision Statement and a Biomass
Roadmap for bioenergy and biobased products.' 0l The Vision Statement sets a goal
of satisfying 18% of the 2010 production target of chemical commodities through
biobased production. 10 2 One of the articulated, and oft-repeated goals of the Vision
Statement and its accompanying Roadmap was "remov[al of) the barriers facing
biomass technologies."'0 3  The Committee's charge extends to all biobased
industries, including biopharming. 0
4
Although this Committee was a joint project between the Departments of
Energy and Agriculture, the Vision Statement and Biomass Roadmap were
emphatically a product of the interested industries. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
tenor of the Committee's public policy recommendations was to support and
facilitate development of biobased industry and to downplay any drawbacks.
10 5
Missing from these recommendations is any discussion of the very serious public
health 10 6 and environmental 10 7 concerns posed by this new technology.
In shelving these concerns in favor of promoting industrial "progress," the
Committee was merely continuing a tradition that had earlier been established by the
96 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, supra note 14, at I I (noting that the extent of confidential
business information claimed by registrants "hampers external review and transparency of the
decision-making process").
97 See FREESE, supra note 64.
98 GENET, How THE BIOTECH INDUSTRY CAPTURED WASHINGTON'S ATTENTION, at http://
www.gene.ch/genet/2003/Jul/msgOO049.html (July 9, 2003).
99 Biomass Research and Development Act, Title Ill of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-224 (2000).
100 Id.
101 See BIOMASS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DOE,
VISION FOR BIOENERGY & BIOBASED PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at http://www.bioproducts-
bioenergy.gov/pdfs/FinalBiomassRoadmap.pdf (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter DOE VISION FOR
BIOENERGY]; BIOMASS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DOE,
ROADMAP FOR BIOMASS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES, at http://www.bioproducts-
bioenergy.gov/pdfs/FinalBiomassRoadmap.pdf (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter DOE BIOMASS ROADMAP].
102 DOE VISION FOR BIOENERGY, supra note 101, at 3.
103 Id. at 5.
104 Pub. L. No. 106-224.
105 DOE VISION FOR BIOENERGY, supra note 101; DOE BIOMASS ROADMAP, supra note 101.
106 The potential for these non-food proteins to render otherwise unidentifiable foods either
allergenic or toxic to consumers is the most prominent of these public health concerns. Because
biopharm crops look exactly like conventional crops, a consumer will have no way to know if she is
inadvertently consuming dangerous compounds.
107 For example, the National Research Council ("NRC") has suggested that large-scale
biobased production would necessitate withdrawing half the land currently fallow under the
Conservation Reserve Program. See COMMITTEE ON BIOBASED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, supra note 10,
at 4.
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Department of Energy ("DOE"). In 1998, the Department of Energy's Office of
Industrial Technology ("OIT") sponsored the Agricultural Industries of the Future as
a public/private collaboration to plan the future of industrial biopharming.' ° 8 This
group produced two critical documents: a strategic vision entitled Plant/Crop Based
Renewable Resources 2020109 and the Technology Roadmap for Plant/Crop-Based
Renewable Resources 2020.110 The Technology Roadmap set a target that, by 2020,
10% of all chemical feedstock demand be satisfied through biopharming."' l DOE
made it clear that the Technology Roadmap was "driven by industry" and that OIT's
role was to "support the development and deployment of technologies that will
shape the future of the agriculture industry."' 12  Indeed, agencies unambiguously
described the Vision Statement and the Biomass Roadmap as articulating the
industries' vision for their future.'' 3
The Technology Roadmap was intended to "encourage industry to undertake
long-term, sector-wide technology planning."'"1 4  Conspicuously absent from this
long-term, sector-wide planning is any consideration of the serious threats that
improperly managed biopharm crops will pose to the U.S. food supply. Protecting
the integrity of the food supply is not among the priorities identified in the
Roadmap, and environmental protection is thrown in as an afterthought."15  No
consumer or environmental non-government organizations , no public health experts,
and for that matter no Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") or Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") officials participated in the workshops that produced the
Roadmap. 116  The only U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") officials were
from the Agricultural Research Service,i"' USDA's in-house biopharm research arm.
108 DOE, AGRICULTURE COMPACT, at http://www.oit.doe.gov/agriculture/compact.shtmI (last
updated Jan. 30, 2004).
109 OFFICE OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, DOE, PLANT/CROP BASED RENEWABLE
RESOURCES 2020, at http://www.oit.doe.gov/agriculture/pdfs/agvision.pdf.
110 OFFICE OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, DOE, TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP FOR PLANT/CROP-
BASED RENEWABLE RESOURCES 2020, DOE/GO 10099-385, 27 (1999), at http://www.oit.doe.gov/
agriculture/pdfs/technologyroadmap.pdf [hereinafter DOE TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP].
III Id. at 10. Despite being available from the DOE website and various other indicia of
government sanction (including participation of DOE and USDA officials), DOE describes the
Technology Roadmap as a process initiated by the National Corn Growers Association, and produced
by organizations representing the U.S. agricultural, forestry, and chemical companies. DOE, VISIONS
AND ROADMAPS, at http://www.oit.doe.gov/agriculture/ visions.shtml (last updated Jan. 30, 2004)
[hereinafter DOE VISIONS AND ROADMAPS].
112 Id.
113 DOE, INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM: AGRICULTURE, at
http://www.oit.doe.gov/agriculture (last updated Jan. 30, 2004).
114 Id. DOE VISIONS AND ROADMAPS, supra note I 1.
115 DOE TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP, supra note 110.
116 Id. at app. 5.
117 The Agricultural Research Service ("ARS") is the in-house research agency of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. ARS conducts extensive biopharm research focusing on:
"developing feedstocks and industrial products, including biofuels and bioenergy, that
expand markets for agricultural materials, replace imports and petroleum-based
products, and offer opportunity to meet environmental needs. This includes developing,
modifying and utilizing new and advanced technologies to convert plant and animal
commodities and by-products to new products and by developing energy crops as well
as new crops to meet niche market opportunities."
This description of ARS is available at USDA, BBCC MEMBER AGENCIES, AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, at http://www.ars.usda.gov/Bbcc/usdaBBCC.htm (last updated Sept. 1I, 2003).
Given ARS's mandate, it is difficult to imagine the agency as a voice for caution in the Roadmap
process.
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No Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") officials experienced in
the logistical problems of trying to prevent cross-contamination and commingling of
agricultural crops were invited to participate.
It was a serious mistake to exclude these important stakeholders from the "long-
term sector-wide" planning process. The Vision Statements and Roadmaps
produced under these circumstances were seriously flawed and are unable to cope
with the very real problems posed by biopharming.
III. REGULATORY GAPS AND BIOPHARMING
USDA has little experience or familiarity with the non-food compounds
involved in biopharming," I some of which are known to have deleterious effects on
human health. For example, the first commercialized biopharm crop is a corn plant
engineered to produce industrial grade avidin, a diagnostic reagent isolated from
chicken egg. l l9 Avidin is known to cause vitamin B deficiency upon excessive
ingestion. 20 The National Academy of Science has been extremely critical of
USDA's handling of avidin corn, calling it an example of lax and inadequate
regulation. 121 Other biopharm crops similarly produce compounds not intended for
consumption as food; indeed, many are intended for oral delivery of medicines.
There has been little assessment of the potential health impacts from food
contaminated with these or any other biopharm crops.' 22 Despite a clear likelihood
that people will ingest these antibodies, plastics, and vaccines with their cornflakes,
we have no knowledge about the health effects of consuming these compounds.12 3
Exposure through ingestion raises serious questions that should be answered before
these crops are commercialized and grown in uncontrolled conditions.
Unfortunately, this means of exposure falls entirely outside the existing regulatory
scheme and is completely unregulated. 124  Because the biopharm crops are not
intended for food, they fall entirely outside FDA's regulatory authority.'12  Nor does
USDA evaluate the health effects of contamination in its permit process. Instead,
USDA imposes a series of physical containment measures on these crops and then
assumes that these measures will prevent contamination of the food supply. 126 This
reliance on physical containment measures flies in the face of all available
information about how such measures actually work.
118 Introduction of Plants Genetically Engineered to Produce Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,434 (Aug. 6, 2003).
119 Hood et al., supra note 75.
120 See FREESE, supra note 64.
121 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, supra note 14, at 180-82.
122 See Press Release, Genetically Engineered Food Alert Campaign Center, EPA Gears Up to
Approve Controversial Bt Corn Without Conducting Human Health Studies (Oct. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.gefoodalert.org/library/admin/uploadedfiles/EPA-Gears-Up-to Approve Controversial Bt Co
m .htm.
123 See id.
124 See The New Farm, U.S. Not Prepared to Monitor Approved Biotech, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS
SERVICE, April 25, 2003, available at http://www.newfarm.com/news/050103/0501/biotech monitor.shtml.
125 Drugs produced through biopharming are, however, subject to the same regulatory regime as
drugs produced by conventional means.
126 For USDA's regulatory plan, see 7 C.F.R. § 340.4 (2003); Field Testing of Plants Engineered to
Produce Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,337 (Mar. 10, 2003).
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A. PAST AS PROLOGUE: THE BIOTECH INDUSTRY'S UNSUCCESSFUL PAST ATTEMPTS
AT PHYSICAL CONTAINMENT
Although few biopharm crops have been commercialized, the first generation of
GM crops have been planted commercially for the past six years---enough time to
develop some sense of how well required physical containment measures are being
implemented for those crops. Unfortunately, industry's track record on successfully
containing GM crops remains singularly unimpressive. A series of near-miss
disasters has undermined public confidence in existing regulatory processes.
StarLink corn is by far the most famous example of how poorly physical
containment measures prevent contamination of the food supply when a food crop is
genetically modified in a manner that precludes its use as food. 127 StarLink corn was
genetically engineered to produce Bt toxin,' 28 a pesticide toxic to some common
lepidopteran pests. 129 Because of the particular nature of the genetic transformation
involved in creating StarLink corn,' 30 there were unanswered questions about
whether StarLink corn was a human allergen.' 3 1 As a result of these allergenicity
concerns, StarLink corn was not approved for use as human food. 132 In order to get
permission to market StarLink corn for animal feed or industrial uses, its
manufacturer assured government regulators that the corn would be kept out of the
human food supply.
133
In September of 2000, however, a coalition of environmental groups announced
they had discovered StarLink corn in twenty-three common grocery products. 134
The announcement set off a frenzy of product recalls and consumer panic.
135
Ultimately, the unapproved and possibly dangerous corn was discovered in more
127 See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink
Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 593, 628-33 (2003); MANDEL, supra note
16.
128 StarLink corn was genetically engineered to contain two novel genes-one conveying
herbicide tolerance and one conveying insect resistance. Uchtmann, supra note 50, at 160. The
herbicide tolerance gene was the product of an earlier approval process. It was the addition of a gene
derived from the bacterial species Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), coding for an insecticidal protein called
Cry9C, that triggered the StarLink crisis. Id. at 160, 174-75.
129 Lepidoptera is a large order of insects, comprised of butterflies and moths. For a
description of the biological mechanism by which Bt kills Lepidopteran pests, see INTERNATIONAL
LIFE SCIENCE INSTITUTE, AN EVALUATION OF INSECT RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT IN BT FIELD CORN:
A SCIENCE BASED FRAMEWORK FOR RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 9-10 (1998),
available at http://www.ilsi.org/file/h5_IRM.pdf.
130 Cry9C, the Bt protein incorporated into StarLink corn, shared properties with some known
food allergens. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, CDC, INVESTIGATION OF
HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED
CORN, at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehhe/Cry9cReport (June 11,2001) [hereinafter CDC REPORT].
131 Marc Kaufman, Biotech Critics Cite Unapproved Corn in Taco Shells: Gene-Modified
Variety Allowed Only for Animal Feed Because ofAllergy Concerns, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2000, at
A2.
132 Approval of Pesticide Product Registrations, 63 Fed. Reg. 28,258 (May 22, 1998).
133 Matt Crenson, Rules for Genetically Modified Corn Broke Down Between Seed Plant,
Farm, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2000, at A10.
134 StarLink Corn: How it Reached the Food Supply, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 4, 2000,
available at http://archive.showmenews.com/2000/dec/20001204busi01 1.asp; see also, Rebecca M.
Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 593, 628-33 (2003
135 See, e.g., Associated Press, Biotech Corn Recall Expands in Stores, Restaurants, WASH.
POST, Nov. 3, 2000, at A5; Mark Kaufman, Corn Woes Prompt Kellogg Plant Shutdown, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 2000 at A2; Western Family Recalls Products with Altered Corn, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Oct. 26, 2000, at A2.
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than 300 types of processed foods that had to be pulled from grocery shelves around
the world. 136 Under heavy pressure from USDA, StarLink's manufacturer, Aventis,
contacted growers and repurchased their remaining StarLink corn to ensure that no
more of it entered the food supply.' 37 These efforts were relatively successful and
most of the StarLink crop was removed from the food supply. 138 Although there was
a "medium likelihood" that StarLink corn was allergenic, 139 the anti-GM activists
had caught the contamination before much non-food corn had entered the food
supply. 140 Therefore, the Centers for Disease Control and FDA concluded that based
on the low exposure there was only a "low probability" that consumers would
actually develop allergies to it.' 41
Even so, the StarLink fiasco had a devastating effect on consumer confidence in
biotechnology and raised troubling questions about whether the integrity of the food
supply is adequately protected. 142 After all, it was only because GM opponents
independently tested packaged corn foods for StarLink contamination and then gave
their discovery of contamination so much publicity that so little StarLink corn made
it into the food supply. That fortunate situation owed nothing to the effectiveness of
regulatory oversight. The crisis also devastated U.S. grain exports. 143
Another notorious incident involved two biopharm corn test plots planted by
one of biopharming's leading companies, ProdiGene. ProdiGene was the first
136 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT REPORT, at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/ENFORCE/ENF00666.html (Nov. 1, 2000). Millions of bushels of StarLink corn had been
commingled with food corn in at least 350 grain elevators. Kurt Eichenwald, New Concerns Rise on
Keeping Track of Modified Corn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2000, at Al.
137 News Release, USDA, Statement by the U.S. Departmentt of Agriculture and the
Environmental Protection Agency, Release No. 0345.00 (Sept. 29, 2000), available at
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2000/09/0345.htm (citing that "[a]t the urging of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency, Aventis will purchase this
year's crop of StarLink corn ...to prevent the current crop of StarLink corn from being used in
processed foods").
138 AVENTIS, AVENTIS CROPSCIENCE STATUS REPORT ON STARLNK (Nov. 9, 2000), available
at http://www.aventis.com/main/page.asp?pageid=63336185872770551170&lang=en (citing that"recalls of food companies have removed [products containing DNA from StarLink corn] from the
food supply").
139 See CDC REPORT, supra note 130. Blood tests failed to find signs of antibodies to the
protein in the genetically engineered corn. Thus, the federal Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention ("CDC") concluded that although the study participants may have experienced allergic
reactions, based upon the results of their study alone, CDC "could not conclude that a reported illness
was a [StarLink] allergic reaction." Id. CDC also cautioned that they could not rule out the possibility
because food allergies may occur without detectible serum antibodies to the antigen. Id.
140 Bratspies, supra note 127, at 628, 645.
141 NATIONAL CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, CDC, INVESTIGATION FOR HUMAN
HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED CORN, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehhe/Cry9cReport/ (June 11, 2001); see also EPA, ADVISORY PANEL
REPORT ASSESSES SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING STARLINK CORN, at http://www.epa.gov/
scipoly/sap/2000/november/starlinkpress.pdf (Dec. 5, 2000).
142 The presence of StarLink corn in human food was unambiguously unlawful, rendering the
foods in question adulterated under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and violating the corn's Plant
Incorporated Pesticide Registration. See Bacillus Thuringiensis subspecies tolworthi Cry9C Protein
and the Genetic Material Necessary for its Production in Corn: Exemption From the Requirement of a
Tolerance, 63 Fed. Reg. 28,258 (May 22, 1998). This exemption eliminated the need to establish a
maximum permissible level for residues of this plant pesticide in, or on, corn used for feed, as well as
in meat, poultry, milk, or eggs resulting from animals fed such feed. The exemption specifically did
not permit human consumption of the StarLink corn itself.
143 For a full exploration of the StarLink crisis, see Bratspies, supra note 127, at 594-98.
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company to develop and commercialize a biopharmed product. 144 Among the
advantages ProdiGene touts for its "plant delivery system" is a "comprehensive
Compliance Plus System that demonstrates a strong commitment to proactive safety
measures."' 145 Twice in 2002, this "Compliance Plus System" failed to ensure that
the most basic preventative measures were observed at two ProdiGene test sites.
Indeed, recently disclosed APIS records reveal that before these incidents,
Prodigene had already racked up a lengthy series of violations over an extended
period of time, with few, if any, consequences. 146
ProdiGene's 2002 violations again involved failures to implement legally
required physical containment measures. 47 Both violations occurred in the Corn
Belt-one in Nebraska and the other in Iowa. 14  At both sites, government
inspectors discovered ProdiGene corn, which had been engineered to produce a
swine vaccine, growing amidst soybeans destined for human consumption. 1'4 9 These
plants were "volunteers" having grown from seeds left in the soil from a prior year's
field trial. Despite a warning to destroy the biopharm corn, 15 the Nebraska grower
instead harvested his fields and sent the soybeans to an elevator where stalks and
leaves from the bioengineered corn were commingled with the soybeans already
present in the elevator. 15' Because the soybeans were now contaminated with the
non-food biopharm corn, APIS ordered the destruction of all 500,000 bushels of
soybeans in the elevator. 152  In response to the Iowa violations, APHIS ordered
Prodigene to uproot and destroy 155 acres of surrounding conventional corn because
the biopharm corn was not adequately separated and, therefore, might have
pollinated the food corn. 153
USDA levied a $250,000 fine against Prodigene, 5 4 but the underlying problem
remains. Clear and legally binding requirements for how this biopharm crop was to
144 PRODIGENE, PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY INTRO, at http://www.prodigene.com/020l.htm (Mar.
23, 2004).
145 PRODIGENE, OUR TECHNOLOGY PLATFORM, at http://www.prodigene.com/0202.htm (Mar.
23, 2004).
146 APHIS, USDA, BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATORY SERVICES, WHAT IS THE COMPLIANCE
HISTORY WITH APHIS BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATIONS?, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/
compliance9.html (Nov. 17, 2003).
147 Press Release, APHIS, USDA, USDA Investigates Biotech Company for Possible Permit
Violations (Nov. 13, 2002), at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/2002/l l/prodigene.html.
148 Id.
149 Emily Gersema, Agriculture Department Fines ProdiGene for Biotech Mishaps,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 7, 2002, at http://earthboundfarm.com/news-world/GMOfine.html; CNN
NEWS, FEDS PROBE BIOTECH FIRM FOR CROP MIXING, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/1l/14/
biotech.contamination (Nov. 14, 2002).
150 Philip Brasher, Biotech Corn May Have Tainted Soybeans, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 13,
2002, at Al.
151 Id.; see also Corn Near Gene-Altered Site to be Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at
C10.
152 Brasher, supra note 150; Corn Near Gene-Altered Site to be Destroyed, supra note 151.
153 Brasher, supra note 150; Corn Near Gene-Altered Site to be Destroyed, supra note 151;
Press Release, APHIS, supra note 147.
154 Press Release, USDA, USDA Announces Actions Regarding Plant Protection Act
Violations Involving ProdiGene, Inc. (Dec. 6, 2002), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/
2002/12/0498.htm. ProdiGene was assessed a $250,000 fine and required to pay more than $3 million
to repurchase the soybeans and to clean the silo. See CHRISTOPHER DOERING, PRODIGENE TO SPEND
MILLIONS ON BIO-CORN TAINTING, at http://www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?
newsid=18935 (Sept. 12, 2002). USDA also required Prodigene to post a $1 million bond and to
comply with additional compliance standards, including additional approvals before field testing and
harvesting genetically modified material. Press Release, USDA, supra. The company will be required
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be handled were ignored.155  The ProdiGene incidents illustrate the problems
inherent to using food plants to produce non-food drugs or industrial feedstocks.
Although the biopharm version looks just like the food crop, the two are not
fungible.' 56 In this case, none of the biopharmed corn seems to have made it all the
way into the food supply, but it was a close call.
Unfortunately, StarLink and ProdiGene are not the only examples of how lax
compliance with physical segregation requirements threatens the U.S. food supply.
As 2002 drew to a close, EPA announced it had levied fines against two more
biotechnology firms, this time in Hawaii, for failure to properly manage
experimental, non-food GM crops. 157 Dow Agrosciences and Pioneer Hi-Bred were
both fined for failure to take proper measures to prevent corn intended for human
consumption from being contaminated with experimental, non-approved GM corn. 158
As part of the settlements, both companies reaffirmed their commitment to following
permit conditions in the future and to immediately reporting any irregularities or
violations.15 9  Just four months later, however, Pioneer Hi-Bred was again in hot
water. EPA fined the company $72,000 for failing to notify EPA immediately of a
new incident in which experimental, non-food corn contaminated food crops. 60
These incidents are only the most public face of a growing problem of
contamination and commingling. In October of 2003, APHIS revealed for the first
time that Monsanto and its partners violated federal regulations for planting
biopharmed or otherwise unapproved GM crops forty-four times from 1990 to 2001
and paid $69,550 in fines in four of those cases. 16' In 2003, Monsanto also
discovered that its Roundup Ready "Quest" canola seeds were contaminated with an
unapproved transgene, necessitating the urgent recall of thousands of bags of canola
seed during planting season.' 62
The growing evidence of cross-contamination from biopharm and experimental
GM crops raises serious questions about the overall likelihood that biopharming can
to develop a written compliance program designed to ensure future compliance with the Plant
Protection Act, federal regulations, and permit conditions. Id.
155 Brasher, supra note 150.
156 For an explanation of the violations and their consequences, see TOM ZINNER, NEBRASKA CROP
CONTAMINATION ISSUE BRIEFING, at http://www.biotech.wisc.edu/Education/prodigene.html (Nov. 14,
2002).
157 Justin Gillis, EPA Fines Biotechsfor Corn Violations, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2002, at E3
[hereinafter Gillis, EPA Fines]; Justin Gillis, Corn Growing Far Afield? A Mishap with Gene-altered
Grain Spotlights the Odds of Contamination, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2002, at El [hereinafter Gillis,
Corn]. Because the experimental GM corn involved in these incidents was engineered to produce a
pesticide, the field test fell under EPA's FIFRA authority.
158 Gillis, Corn, supra note 157. On a related note, FDA is investigating whether genetically
modified pigs were improperly sold into the human food supply. Aaron Zitner, Pigs in Genetic Study
May Have Ended Up as Food, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at Al 7. This incident underscores the very
real possibilities that any GM products might wind up in the human food supply. The likely effects of
a failure to segregate must be considered at the approval stage.
159 Gillis, EPA Fines, supra note 157; see also Stephen Tvedten, Two Biotech Companies
Fined for Violations, at http://safe2use.com/ca-ipm/02-12-18e.htm (Dec. 16, 2002).
160 Justin Gillis, Firm Fined for Spread Of Altered Corn Genes: Government Wasn't Told Soon
Enough, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2003, at E4.
161 Randy Fabi, USDA Reports 115 Infractions of Biotech Rules, REUTERS, Oct. 20, 2003,
available at http://www.calgefree.org/news/sept2003.shtml.
162 Judy Steed, Seeds of Conflict, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 12, 2003, available at http://
www.mindfully.org/GE/2003/Percy-Schmeiser-Monsanto 12nov03.htm. This discovery was
reminiscent of Garth seed's discovery in 2000 that StarLink transgenes had contaminated other hybrid
corn varieties.
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be done safely in food crops. 163 This history of multiple lapses and failures to follow
containment protocols do not bode well for safe use of this technology. That basic
safety precautions were not taken during the earliest stages of the technology's
development ought to raise alarms regarding what will happen if the crops ever go
into full-scale production. Environmental and human health impacts of biopharming
will only increase as more and more of these crops are planted. These concerns are
magnified by proposals to produce more than one novel protein simultaneously in
the same plant, and/or to reuse the crops as food once the biopharm compounds have
been extracted, a proposal known as "co-production. 164
B. USDA HAS ABDICATED ITS REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES
The United States has no comprehensive statute addressing the testing and
monitoring of genetically engineered products. Indeed, such products have never
been tested for long-term effects on human health. Rather, genetically engineered
products are regulated under existing statutes relating to food, drugs, agriculture, or
the environment based on the product's intended use. 165  FDA, 166 USDA, 167 and
EPA 168 all have partial authority over various aspects of GM crops. In theory,
USDA determines whether a GM crop is safe to grow, FDA if it is safe to eat, and
EPA if it is safe for the environment.' 69
163 See DANILA ODER, Is BIOPHARMING WORTH THE RISK?, at
http://www.inquisitoronline.com/news/0306gm.html (June I, 2003).
164 See COMMITTEE ON BIOBASED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, supra note 10, at 4 (emphasizing
that such "co-production" could minimize conflicts with use of land for food production); Glynis
Giddings et at., Transgenic Plants as Factories for Biopharmaceuticals, 18 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
1151 (2000) (suggesting that the costs of purifying specialty chemicals could be defrayed by selling
the food components of the crop).
165 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June
26, 1986).
166 FDA regulates biotechnology products under statutes relating to food (except for meat,
poultry, and egg products, which are regulated by the USDA), feed, drugs, and medical devices. See
21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 395 (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 171.1-571.1 (2003). In May 1992, FDA published a
policy statement regarding food derived from new plant varieties. In this statement, FDA concluded
that food and feed derived from genetically modified organisms should be regulated in the same
manner as food and feed derived from traditionally bred plants, which leaves the responsibility of
assuring the safety of the food with the producer. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New
Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992).
167 USDA regulates biotech crops under the PPA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 (2000), which
consolidated several previous statutes that APHIS used to regulate genetically engineered organisms,
including the Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj, and the Plant Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 151-164a, 166-167. The Secretary of Agriculture has delegated her authority under the PPA to
APHIS, and I will use APHIS and USDA interchangeably in this discussion. Because no new
regulations have yet been issued pursuant to the PPA, APHIS continues to regulate biotechnology
products according to the regulations issued under the old statutes. For USDA's Internet site on
biotechnology, see http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/index.html.
168 EPA regulates genetically modified organisms primarily under statutes relating to toxic
substances and pesticides. See Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(2000) (regulating toxic substances); FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (regulating pesticides). Under
TSCA, EPA regulates GM microorganisms, and under FIFRA it regulates so-called plant incorporated
protectorants (like Bt crops) and pesticidal microorganisms. EPA also has responsibilities under the
FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 346a(a)-(o) (regulating tolerances or exemptions for the requirement of a
tolerance for pesticide residues in foods). Relevant regulations may be found at 40 C.F.R. § 152.1-
.500, 2172.1-.59, 180.1-.1206, 725.1 .1000 (2003).
169 APHIS, USDA, UNITED STATES REGULATORY OVERSIGHT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES-OVERVIEW, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/usregs.html (last visited June
26, 2004).
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Biopharming does not fit well into this regulatory scheme. Although the
therapeutics produced through biopharming will be drugs (and will thus be subject to
FDA's traditional drug safety evaluations under the FFDCA), the crops themselves
are neither drugs nor food. Thus, even though it is inevitable that these biopharm
products will find their way into the food supply, the biopharm crops fall entirely
outside FDA's scope of authority. Unless the biopharm crops also produce
pesticides, EPA has no authority over these crops either, even though there are clear
environmental risks from spread of biopharm pollens or proteins. Thus, it falls
solely to USDA to regulate biopharming.
Under the best of circumstances, properly regulating these crops would be a
daunting task. Circumstances are, however, far from ideal. USDA regulates these
crops under the same authority it uses to regulate other GM crops-the Plant
Protection Act ("PPA"). 7 ° The PPA focuses primarily on agronomic risks, and does
not give USDA a clear mandate to consider food safety or environmental
concerns.'' Not only is its regulatory authority constrained, but USDA has an
added problem-it holds conflicting mandates both to protect safety and to promote
this new industry.
In 2002, Secretary Veneman established the Biobased Products and Bioenergy
Coordination Council ("BBCC") 172  to "facilitate and promote research,
development, transfer of technology, commercialization, and marketing for biobased
products and [B]ioenergy using renewable domestic agricultural (plant, animal and
marine) and forestry materials."' 173 Among the identified goals of the BBCC is"establish[ing] USDA as the lead advocate for the development and
commercialization of biobased industrial and commercial products."'174 USDA, the
lead regulatory agency, self-described itself as the technology's lead advocate and
announced that it would "cooperate with the private sector in developing and
demonstrating the potential commercial viability"'175 of biopharming. With the
agency avowing its intent to encourage accelerated research and development, 176
who, if anyone, is protecting the public's interests in having this technology
exploited only under conditions that protect human health and environmental safety?
This conflict between protection and promotion is visible in the regulatory
scheme APHIS adopted. Until recently, scrutiny of biopharm crops was extremely
light. 177 Field tests could proceed under a streamlined notification process and no
permit was required. 178 On March 6, 2003, in response to the StarLink, ProdiGene,
and Hawaii incidents, APHIS announced new requirements for biopharm crops to be
170 PPA, 7 U.S.C. § 7701.
171 See Bratspies, supra note 127, at 602-03.
172 Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman ordered the establishment of the Biobased Products
and Bioenergy Coordination Council in 2002. USDA, DEPARTMENTAL REGULATION 9600-002, at
http://www.ars.usda.gov/Bbcc/DR9600-002.htm (Aug. 26, 2002) [hereinafter USDA DEPARTMENTAL
REGULATION].
173 Id.
174 USDA, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR BIOBASED PRODUCTS THROUGH THE BIOBASED PRODUCTS
AND BIOENERGY COORDINATION COUNCIL, at http://www.ars.usda.gov/Bbcc/BBCCstrateg.htm (June
1999).
175 USDA DEPARTMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 172.
176 Id.
177 For a discussion of the flawed regulation of genetically modified crops, see Bratspies, supra note
127.
178 Seeid.at604-05.
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implemented for the 2003 growing season and beyond. 179 In its summary of the new
rules, APHIS emphasized that these biopharm products are never meant to enter the
food supply and indicated that a stringent regulatory system would be necessary.180
To that end, APHIS imposed safety measures based on plans for physical
segregation. Seeking to control the likely routes for contamination, the new
requirements introduced regular inspections, and imposed growing conditions and
farm equipment standards.' For the first time, there were: 1) mandatory field site
inspections; 182 2) a requirement that no biopharm corn be grown within one mile of
open-pollinated corn; 183 and 3) restrictions on the production of food and feed crops
at the field test site and perimeter fallow zone in the subsequent growing season. 184
In addition to these in-field physical containment measures, APHIS also imposed a
series of logistical requirements designed to minimize contact. APHIS required that
biopharm crops be planted and harvested with dedicated mechanized equipment that
will be stored in dedicated facilities. 185 In addition, APHIS must approve equipment
cleaning procedures 86 and seed cleaning and drying procedures, 187 and all biopharm
producers must attend a training program to increase the likelihood of compliance
with permit conditions.1
88
APHIS characterized these new regulations as a revision of the regulatory
framework "that reflects the latest science and information so that we can maintain
the integrity of our systems."' 189 Although APIIS claimed that the new conditions
were "science based and reflect[ed] the anticipated increase of requests for permits
for plants genetically engineered to produce pharmaceutical and industrial
compounds,"' 90 it is clear that this agency action was reactive rather than proactive.
For example, until the 2003 growing season there were still no analogous (or for that
matter any) requirements for industrial biopharm crop permits.' 9' On August 6,
2003, a full decade after the first field tests of industrial biopharm crops, 92 APHIS
finally published an interim rule requiring that industrial biopharm crops be field
179 Field Testing of Plants Engineered to Produce Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds,
68 Fed. Reg. 11,337 (Mar. 10, 2003). For a commentary on this APHIS response to the misuse of
genetically engineered crops, see KARIL KOCHENDERFER, COMMENTS SUBMITTED RE: DOCKET No.
03-031 -I, at http://www.gmabrands.com/publicpolicy/docs/comment.cfm?Docl D = 1135 (last visited
June 26, 2004).
180 APHIS, USDA, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE: CHANGES IN THE PERMIT
CONDITIONS FOR 2003, at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2003/03/aphisfactsheetO30603.pdf (last
visited Apr. 7, 2004).
181 68 Fed. Reg. at 11,337.
182 Id. at 11,338-39. Under the new regulations, every test site will be inspected during critical
times in the biopharm production cycle. Up to five site visits might be made during the growing
season, with another two for assessing volunteer plants the following year. Under the old rules, plots
were rarely inspected.
183 Id. at 11,338.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Press Release, APHIS, USDA, USDA Strengthens 2003 Permit Conditions for Field
Testing Genetically Engineered Plants (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/
releases/2003/03/aphis030603.htm (statement of Bobby Acord, APHIS Administrator).
190 Id.
191 Introductions of Plants Genetically Engineered to Produce Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,434 (Aug. 6, 2003).
192 Id.
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tested, moved, or imported only with a duly issued permit.' 93 The interim rule will
be in effect until December 2004.194 Prior to 2003, field testing could be conducted
under the expedited notification provisions, with no set standards for containment or
oversight. 95  Between 1993 and 2001, APHIS received ten notifications of
introduction of plant-made industrials. 96  In the first half of 2003 alone, APHIS
received five permit applications.' 97 Only public disclosure of the ProdiGene near-
miss, coming on the heels of the StarLink fiasco prompted APHIS to act.
It remains to be seen how APHIS will administer its physical containment
measures. As the crops move into commercial production, it is extremely unlikely
that APHIS will be able to oversee or enforce these regulations. APIS reports that
in 2002, 130 acres of pharmaceutical biopharm crops were planted at thirty-four
sites, most of which were smaller than 5 acres. 198 Thus, using 2002 as an example,
APHIS new regulations would have required a minimum of 238 site visits (seven per
site: five during the growing season and two thereafter).' 99 That number does not
include any industrial sites.200 In 2000 and 2001, APHIS had ten staff members to
evaluate biotech applications.20 ' Even before APHIS adopted this stepped up
inspection regime, the National Research Council concluded that APIUS did not
employ enough personnel to visit all the field test sites and that many of the
inspectors were poorly trained. 2  In years when there is an emergency priority, such
as the recent European foot and mouth disease outbreak, even fewer inspectors are
available to inspect biopharm field tests.20 3
While APIUS might theoretically retain sufficient staff and resources to conduct
238 visits to the existing field trials (the National Research Council concluded that
ten APHIS employees' duties included inspecting these fields), 20 4 the agency has
indicated that it expects requests for field test permits and the scale of production to
increase significantly over the next few years.2°5 APHIS' overloaded staff already
reviews approximately 1,000 applications for field testing and deregulation of
206 hadttransgenic plants each year. It is hard to imagine agency resources stretching
193 Id.
194 Id. at 46,435.
195 Id. at 46,434.
196 Id. at 46,435.
197 Id. In March of 2003, APHIS published proposed rules for field testing plant-made
pharmaceuticals and industrial chemicals. See Field Testing of Plants Engineered to Produce
Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,337 (Mar. 10, 2003). These proposed
rules indicated that APHIS was considering extending permit requirements to plant-made industrials.
Id. at 11,338. In a press release that accompanied publication of the proposed rules, APHIS indicated
that the agency intended to publish an interim final rule that will require a permit for the field testing
of industrials for the 2003 growing season, and strongly encouraged any 2003 applicants to request a
permit for field testing industrials. Press Release, APHIS, USDA, USDA To Require Permits for All
Industrial Biotech Plants (Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/industrial_
biotech.html. Accordingly, those entities submitting proposals in 2003 submitted permit applications
rather than notifications. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,435.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, supra note 14 at 182.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 See Field Testing of Plants Engineered to Produce Pharmaceutical and Industrial
Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,337 (Mar. 10, 2003).
206 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, supra note 14 at 1.
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further. Certainly if the United States achieves the Roadmap vision of biopharming
producing 10% of chemical feedstocks by 2020 (and that figure does not include the
expected boom in biopharmaceuticals!), APHIS will not be able to conduct all the
required visits. Indeed, the number of test plantings will not have to increase by
much before APHIS' resources will be inadequate to make the promised seven visits
over two years to each test plot. Moreover, once full production begins, the agency
will not have the capacity to visit every commercial grower on such a schedule.
Without this critical piece of the regulatory patchwork, it is unclear how APHIS
envisions fulfilling its compliance monitoring obligations, particularly since GM
purveyors routinely use CBI claims to keep field test locations secret.2 °7 Coupled
with the lack of oversight staff, this prevalence of CBI claims is particularly
troubling. While the companies have a legitimate interest in preventing corporate
vandalism or corporate espionage, the public has a strong interest in knowing
whether biopharmed crops are contaminating adjacent conventional crops with
substances that are clearly not intended for human or animal consumption. Secrecy
eliminates the possibility that private actors will be able to independently monitor
contamination levels. Since there is no governmental monitoring system, and no
requirement that the GM purveyors monitor surrounding fields for contamination,
shutting off the possibility of third-party monitoring means that there will be no
monitoring of any kind. Remember, the StarLink fiasco came to light solely as a
result of vigilant third-party monitoring.20 8 The lack of independent monitoring is a
serious deficiency, one that all but ensures that the regulatory scheme is unlikely to
be responsive and trustworthy.
Indeed, these exact same constraints have prevented physical containment
measures from achieving more than marginal success as a risk management tool for
other GM crops, in particular those crops modified to express Bt toxins. Because of
concerns about rapid evolution of pest resistance, EPA has developed some simple
conditions for how Bt crops can be planted. In particular, EPA requires that, at
most, 80% of the corn on a farm be Bt corn, with the other 20% conventional
corn. 09 In addition, these conventional corn refuges must be planted within one
quarter mile of the Bt fields. 210  An industry survey conducted during the 2002
growing season indicated that 11% of farmers failed to comply with these
requirements .21 The Center for Science in the Public Interest examined a parallel
set of data submitted to USDA's National Agricultural Statistical Service, and
discovered that growers self-reported information amounted to non-compliance
levels 40% higher than those reported through the industry survey.212 Similarly, a
USDA review of compliance found that 20% of Bt corn growers failed to comply
207 Id. at 11.
208 THE CAMPAIGN TO LABEL GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, GE FOODS TUTORIAL: STARLINK
FIASCO INCREASES PRESSURE FOR REGULATION, at http://www.thecampaign.org/educationibrochure_
starlink.htm (last visited May 6, 2004).
209 See EPA, BIOPESTICIDES REGISTRATION ACTION DOCUMENT: BACILLUS THURINGIENSIS
PLANT-INCORPORATED PROTECTANTS, at II.B.5, at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/
bt_brad.htm (Oct. 16, 2001).
210 Id.
211 AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY STEWARDSHIP TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, INSECT
RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT GROWER SURVEY FOR 2002 BT FIELD CORN GROWING SEASON, at
http://www.ncga.com/index.shtml (Dec. 19, 2002).
212 GREGORY JAFFE, PLANTING TROUBLE: ARE FARMERS SQUANDERING BT CORN
TECHNOLOGY?, at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/btcorn report.pdf (June 19, 2003).
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213with federal growing requirements. The Prodigene fiasco certainly suggests that
there is no reason to expect that biopharm growers will be any more compliant than
are farmers growing other GM crops, and thus, depending on farmers to implement
physical containment measures should not be the primary plan for keeping biopharm
crops out of the food supply.
Even putting aside the careless or intentional acts at the root of StarLink (and
Prodigene), the physical containment of living plants is next to impossible. Plants
reseed themselves. It requires eternal vigilance on the part of the grower to eradicate
the volunteer plants that grow the next season, and such vigilance is both time-
consuming and expensive. Moreover, these volunteer plants might grow in
neighboring fields in addition to the test fields themselves. Behaviors needed to
control volunteer plants are not easily captured by a regulatory system based on
physical segregation. The constant monitoring needed to identify and eradicate
these volunteer plants places a significant burden on growers.
Because the risks are difficult to understand, and there is no way to recapture
the added costs of this monitoring, growers are likely to slip up on their efforts. Any
such lapses render physical containment measures-USDA's sole regulatory plan
for protecting the food supply-wholly ineffective. These lapses are particularly
likely because pollen drift is nearly impossible to control and is difficult to trace.214
This is a fatal flaw in USDA's decision to rely exclusively on physical containment
measures, and it is not amenable to easy solution. For physical containment to have
any hope of working, growers must be committed and dedicated to eradicating
volunteers. Nevertheless, USDA requires no certification or special training for
biopharmers, nor has USDA created a monitoring and reporting system to track the
occurrence of volunteer plants. In fact, USDA has no way to monitor either grower
vigilance or actual incidents of contamination. Even if USDA required that growers
report their planting patterns and actually followed up to ensure that the plantings
correctly matched the submitted patterns, such measures would bear no relationship
to grower vigilance against volunteers and would utterly fail to detect contamination
of nearby fields.
Compounding the problem, USDA has not required biopharm companies to
develop tests to identify biopharm contamination, nor has it developed such tests on
its own.2 15 Remember, biopharm crops are phenotypically indistinguishable from
food crops. Without a readily available and easily performed identity test, grain
silos and food manufacturers have no way to know whether they are inadvertently
purchasing biopharmed crops. We have seen this before. It was precisely this
inability to distinguish food corn from non-food corn that gave rise to the StarLink
fiasco.216 Successful risk management based on physical containment requires, at
the very least, that contamination be readily identifiable.
213 Emily Gersema, USDA Survey Shows Biotech Rules Breaches, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,
Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://www.tallahassee.com/mld/tallahassee/news/politics/6739974.htm.
214 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SERVICES, BREAKING NEW GROUND: HARMFUL OR
NOT, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD COULD LEAD TO KNOTTY PROBLEMS, at http://
www.aaisonline.comViewpoint/01 fall2.html (last visited June 26, 2004).
215 Aventis had not developed any such tests for StarLink corn prior to the StarLink fiasco.
One recommendation made in the aftermath of that incident was that the government ensure that such
tests are developed prior to the release of any genetically engineered crop. See ASSESSMENT OF
ADDITIONAL SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING STARLINK CORN, FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY
PANEL, SAP REPORT No. 2001-09, 39, at http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/2001/july/julyfinal.pdf
(July 17, 2001).
216 Bratspies, supra note 127, at 624-25, 630.
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In the most recent guidance to industry, USDA and FDA "strongly
recommend," but do not require, that companies develop tests to identify
contamination in raw agricultural products. 1 7 A mere recommendation, however
strong, is totally inappropriate here. Tests to discover contamination cannot be
optional. In the absence of an express requirement, no biopharm developer has
produced such a test. Without the test, there is no way to identify biopharm crops or
contaminated crops and to ensure that such crops are diverted to non-food uses.
Moreover, UDSA's guidance does not suggest, "strongly" or otherwise, that
biopharm purveyors monitor adjacent crops for evidence of contamination.
Apparently, APHIS has satisfied itself that its proposed field practices will prevent
contamination. APHIS inspectors will, at best, monitor to see if those field practices
are being met.2 18 The agency has no intentions of monitoring, or requiring the
biopharm purveyor to monitor, for actual contamination of nearby crops with non-
food biopharm compounds. 21 9 Thus, there is no way to learn whether the physical
containment practices, APIUS' primary regulatory strategy, are working. The
National Research Council points to this "lack of rigor" in APHIS procedures as a
potential source of serious contamination problems. 220 Indeed, in other contexts,
FDA recognizes "develop[ing], enhanc[ing], and maintain[ing] surveillance systems
that can quickly and accurately identify food safety risks in the human food" as the
key to an effective emergency response capability.221  Because USDA does not
require that tests be developed to identify contamination, there is no such
surveillance system for biopharmed crops and no way to respond quickly in an
emergency. In light of the industry's checkered history of contamination and
commingling, there is no excuse for failing to require such tests.
IV. REPAIRING THE INADEQUATE AND POROUS REGULATORY SYSTEM
Non-food biotech products will enter the human food supply. After examining
the prospect of corn biopharming in the Corn Belt, the National Research Council
concluded that using food crops to produce non-edible and potentially harmful
222compounds creates serious regulatory issues. In an unusually frank editorial,
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY identified some of the major flaws with reliance onphysical confinement: that gene-containment is next to impossible in the field and
217 See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DRUGS, BIOLOGICS, AND MEDICAL DEVICES DERIVED
FROM BIOENGINEERED PLANTS FOR USE IN HUMANS AND ANIMALS, 67 Fed. Reg. 57828 (Sept. 12,
2002).
218 Fields used to grow biopharm plants are subject to USDA inspection under 7 C.F.R. § 340.
219 Id.
220 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, supra note 14, at 181. This NRC comment referred to field
testing under notification. On August 6, 2003, APHIS issued an interim rule requiring that plants
genetically modified to produce industrial compounds be field-tested only under a more rigorous
permit system. Introductions of Plants Genetically Engineered to Produce Industrial Compounds,
Interim Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,434 (Aug. 6, 2003). For the 2003 growing season, APHIS had similarly
decided that plants engineered to produce pharmaceutical compounds should be administered under
permit rather than notification. See 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(b)(4)(iii) (2003). APHIS' identified rationale for
this shift was its lack of regulatory experience or scientific familiarity with the non-food, non-feed
nature of biopharming. 68 Fed. Reg. 46,435.
221 USDA, STATEMENT OF BERNARD A. SCHWETZ, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER, FDA, BEFORE THE SENATE GOV'T AFFAIRS SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T
MGMT., RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2001/
foodsafety 101O.html (Oct. 10, 2001 ).
222 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, supra note 14, at 229.
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that farmers have proven to be unwilling or unable to follow planting rules.223
USDA's regulatory scheme takes neither of these critical variables into account.
In the 1970s, scientists responded to growing concerns that biotechnology was
developing more rapidly than the ability to understand or manage the risks it posed
by developing the Asilomar self-regulation plan.224 This plan was based on the
conviction that standards of care should be "greater at the beginning and modified as
improvements in the methodology occur and assessments of the risks change., 225
Those lessons have powerful resonance today in the context of biopharming. In
much the same way the Asilomar Conference imposed a moratorium to permit the
development of more information about risk,226 there should be a moratorium on
field testing biopharm crops to permit information about risks to catch up to the
biopharming industry's technical capabilities to convert plants into biofactories. If
industry cannot, or will not, self-impose these sensible restrictions, 227 government
must stand ready to take up the slack. Indeed, given the stakes, the government
ought not rely on industry self-regulation as its first line of defense. Instead, taking
a lead from the Asilomar Conference, APIS should impose a temporary partial
moratorium on biopharming. During this moratorium, which would be an interim
period during which research on the health effects of these crops could be
performed, the agency should restrict the technology to greenhouse plantings or to
non-food crops. Such a decision would permit the technology to go forward, albeit
more slowly, and with full respect for the many unknowns. Once more scientific
information has been gathered, the agency and the public can make informed choices
about the risks and benefits associated with biopharming.
A. POSSIBLE FDA REGULATORY MEASURES
A strong base of scientific knowledge is the foundation of any successful food
safety system.228 FDA claims that food safety must rest on strong "risk-based
prevention standards" to prevent contamination of all human foods and animal feeds
over "the farm-to-table continuum., 22 9 The risks here are plain and this same rigor
must be brought to biopharm crops. Even in the face of USDA reluctance to involve
FDA in approving biopharm crops, the agency need not be entirely passive. FDA
could influence industry behavior by declaring "biopharm action levels"-the
conditions under which the agency might seek to have a court find a food adulterated
by biopharm crops. 230 By publicly announcing its enforcement policy, FDA might
spur industry to confront these questions and thus drive development of this
technology towards safer options. 231 There is no justification for failing to use the
223 Going with the Flow, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 527 (2002).
224 Berg et al., Asilomar Conference, supra note 45.
225 See id.
226 Id.
227 One critical difference between biopharm research at the time of the Asilomar Conference
and research today is that most biopharm research is industry funded, and thus subject to commercial
pressures from investors that Asilomar scientists did not have to face.
228 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ENSURING SAFE FOOD FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 91-
93 (1998), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309065593/html/index.html.
229 Id.
230 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 342(a)(1) (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 109.4, 109.6 (2003).
231 Cf Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 307-09 (1999) (describing creative
enforcement in the context of the Endangered Species Act).
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full arsenal of agency powers to respond to this serious threat to the safety of the
food supply.
Given what we know from experience with other GM crops, it is entirely
inappropriate for the government to approach biopharming on a post hoc basis.
Regulators must be involved at the planning stages; they cannot wait for developers
come to the agencies with a largely completed product. At that point, modifications
to protect public health are after-the-fact add-ons, and are far more expensive and
less effective than design modifications would have been during the development
process.
B. POSSIBLE BIOLOGICAL CONTROL MEASURES
In the earliest stages of biotechnology, the Asilomar Conference recognized that
"[t]he most significant contribution to limiting the spread of recombinant DNA is the
use of biological barriers. 232 Somehow this initial insight was lost. Rather than a
mere "additional factor of safety, 2 33 physical containment measures have taken
precedence as the primary means to contain biopharming's adverse effects. This
inverted reliance on physical, rather than biological, containment measures must be
reversed.
1. Use of Non-Food Crops
APHIS' post-Prodigene physical containment requirements mark a start towards
responsible regulation. The requirements will undoubtedly strengthen the
protections of the food supply, but they are too little, too late. Other measures
would provide far greater protection without simultaneously creating the need for a
detailed and expensive oversight system.
The most obvious of these measures would be to require that biopharming occur
only in non-food crops like tobacco, hemp or switch grass. Simply put, since it will
not be possible to keep biopharm corn out of the food supply, food crops should not
be production vehicles for biopharming. 234 Such a rule would be the clearest way to
protect public health while still permitting society to benefit from the potential
represented by this new technology. In one fell swoop, USDA could eliminate any
possibility of commingling. The clean regulatory line of "no biopharming in food
crops" would be easy to comply with, thus fitting neatly into the various vision
statements and roadmaps aimed at nurturing this technology by avoiding
burdensome regulation. Moreover, many biopharm developers have hedged their
bets and have proceeded with parallel development of biopharm crops in tobacco. 235
232 Berg et al., Summary Statement, supra note 46, at 1982.
233 Id.
234 In addition to contamination of the food supply, biopharming also raises questions about
the environmental effects of gene flow to wild relatives. "Twelve of the world's thirteen most
important crops are known to hybridize with wild relatives somewhere in their agricultural range."
Ralph Haygood et al., Consequences of Recurrent Gene Flow from Crops to Wild Relatives, 270
PROC. R. Soc. LOND. B. 1879, 1879 (2003). Indeed, of the top sixty crop plants, only eleven do not
hybridize with wild relatives somewhere in the world, and a majority has wild relatives in the United
States. Daniell, supra note 8, at 361. These questions would not be resolved by restricting
biopharming to non-food crops, though, because it would reduce the likelihood of contaminated
pollen, chloroplast transformation would certainly reduce the environmental impacts these crops will
have on natural ecosystems.
235 See Margot Roosevelt, Cures on the Cob, TIME, May 26, 2003, at 56; see also Jonathan
Nevit et al., Participatory Assessment of the Social and Economic Impacts of Biotechnology (2003)
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Thus, non-food biopharming could serve a dual public interest-providing access to
needed therapeutics while, at the same time, weaning tobacco farmers from a
perverse dependence on a continued market for cigarettes.
The biopharming industry itself agrees that it cannot afford another public
relations disaster, and certainly not a public health catastrophe.236 Food producers
have called for a ban on biopharming in food crops.237 The Grocery Manufacturers
of America have also urged biotech companies to stop using food crops as vehicles
for growing biotech products that humans and animals are not supposed to eat.238
2. Chloroplast Transformation
At the very least, biopharm crops should always be modified through
chloroplast transformation 239 -a means to produce high levels of novel proteins
while ensuring that the pollen does not contain transgenes. 240 Because chloroplasts
are maternally inherited, there are usually no chloroplasts in pollen.2 4 1 Transforming
chloroplast DNA rather than nuclear DNA would greatly reduce the threat of cross-
pollination.242 As such, this biological containment mechanism could be a partial
solution to contamination of the food supply. Ideally, those two biological safety
measures would be combined so that biopharming occurs in non-food crops that
have undergone chloroplast transformation. These biological segregation methods
could be added to the physical segregation methods APHIS now imposes, but the
need for oversight would be less pressing because the risks to human health would
be radically reduced. Although biopharm crops are developed enough to make these
design modification choices expensive, and therefore unpalatable, it is not too late to
require these sensible and practical restrictions on exploitation of the new
technology.
(unpublished working paper, Virginia Tech), at http://www.agecon.vt.edu/biotechimpact/tobacco/
WP2003 I.pdf.
236 See Justin Gillis, Biotech Industry Adopts Precaution: Altered Plants Banned Near Major
Food Crops, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2002, at El, E4 (quoting Michael H. Pauley executive director of
biotechnology for Epicyte Pharmaceutical Inc., which is testing a herpes drug grown in corn as saying
"I think we can all agree that this industry cannot afford StarLink 1I .... One incident like that is
unacceptable. It's going to require a certain standard of behavior from the entire industry.").
237 Philip Brasher, Biotech Firm Under Fire Has Links to Iowa, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 14,
2002, available at http://desmoinesregister.com/business/stories/c4789013/19735220.html.
238 Press Release, Grocery Manufacturers of America, GMA Urges the Use of Non-Food Crops
for Biotech Drugs (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.gmabrands.com/news/docs/NewsRelease.
cfm?DoclD=10298.
239 Simon Geir Moller et al., The Topological Specificity Factor AtMinEl Is Essential for
Correct Plastid Division Site Placement in Arabidopsis, 31 PLANT J. 269 (2002).
240 Henry Daniell, GM Crops: Public Perceptions and Scientific Solutions, 4 TRENDS IN PLANT
SC. 467, 468 (1999); Henry Daniell et al., Containment of Herbicide Resistance Through Genetic
Engineering of the Chloroplast Genome, 16 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 345 (1998); Susan E. Scott &
Mike J. Wilkinson, Low Probability of Chloroplast Movement from Oilseed Rape (Brassica napus)
Into Wild Brassica rapa, 17 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 390 (1999).
241 S. Milius, The Green Genes Don't Get Out Much, SCIENCE NEWS, April 10, 1999, available
at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m 1200/15 155/54492437/pi/article.jhtml.
242 Some researchers believe that, because of their prokaryotic nature, chloroplasts are ideal for
biopharming therapeutics that are currently produced in E.coli systems, including vaccines and
antibodies. See Daniell, supra note 8, at 366.
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3. Other Available Containment Measures
Making the biopharm crops "look different" would be another common sense
precaution that would greatly reduce the risk to the food supply. More than a decade
ago, researchers successfully engineered firefly luciferase 243 and green fluorescent
protein into tobacco, rendering the crop luminescent. 244 Other phenotypic markers
like restricting biopharming to purple maize varieties and banning the use of these
varieties in food could also make tracking biopharm crops a more straightforward
proposition and contamination more readily identifiable.
Another layer of protection could be added through geographic containment:
banning the planting of biopharm crops where their conventional counterparts are
grown for food, and requiring extensive food safety testing before permitting field
testing of any biopharm crop that is also used for food. Because this new technology
will potentially be very lucrative,245 such calls face stiff political opposition from
Corn Belt officials who do not want their states left out. 24 6 Indeed, in the wake of
the ProdiGene incident, Biotechnology Industry Organization ("BIO"), a biotech
industry trade group, issued a commitment not to grow biopharm corn in the Corn
Belt.247 Reaction from Corn Belt politicians was immediate and negative.248 BIO
quickly backed down.249 Only the federal government has the power to make such a
rule stick, and the resources to provide enough of a countervailing benefit to make
the rule palatable.
Any or all of these additional control measures would better protect the food
supply than do USDA's physical containment measures. Moreover, these measures
would ensure that commercialization of biopharm crops is channeled only into paths
that are likely to protect public safety. It is inexcusable that USDA has adopted
none of these proactive measures but instead waits until biopharm crops are ready
for field testing and then contents itself with imposing physical containment
measures.
243 See, e.g., M. Schneider et al., The In Vivo Pattern of Firefly Luciferase Expression in
Transgenic Plants, 14 PLANT MOL. BIOL. 935 (1990); Stephen J. Howell, Transient and Stable
Expression of the Firefly Luciferase Gene in Plant Cells and Transgenic Plants, 234 SCIENCE 856
(1986).
244 Brian K. Harper et al., Green Fluorescent Protein As A Marker for Expression of A Second
Gene in Transgenic Plants, 17 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1125 (1999); Staci Leffel et al., Tracking
Transgenic Plants Using Green Flourescent Protein, at http://www.isb.vt.edu/brarg/brasym96/
leffel96.htm (last visited June 26, 2004). The most famous use of this marker is the well-known photo
of a "glow-in-the-dark" rabbit.
245 Some industry estimates are that biopharmaceutical production may be a $12-14 billion
industry by 2005. See Iowa State Response to the BIO Guidance Concerning "Plants Intended Not to
Be Used for Food or Feed", at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/releases/2002/p02rl 1-04a.htm (last
visited May 6, 2004) (objecting to BIO's moratorium on the ground that it would exclude Iowa from
lucrative biopharming opportunities).
246 See, e.g., Philip Brasher, Iowa Denied New 'Drug' Corn, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 23, 2002, at
Al.
247 Voluntary moratorium on planting some biotech crops in certain regions, FOOD INSTITUTE
REP., Oct. 28, 2002; Justin Gillis, Biotech Industry Adopts Precaution: Altered Plants Banned Near
Major Food Crops, Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 2002 at E. 1, E.4.
248 Iowa's Senator Chuck Grassley led the campaign to get this commitment revoked stating:
"BIO is responding to the demands of special interest, not the demands of science. I'll continue to
work to ensure that Iowa is not unjustly left out of corn-based pharmaceutical crop production." Press
Release, Grassley Continues Efforts to Support Biotech Crop Production in Iowa (Nov. 4, 2002),
available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/releases/2002/p02rl 1-04.htm.
249 Philip Brasher, Biotech Group Lifts Corn Ban, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 4, 2002, at Al.
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When protection of the food supply rests entirely on physical containment
measures, there are at least four likely routes for these biopharmed non-food crops to
enter the human food supply: I) direct human action intentionally or negligently
contaminating the food supply; 2) volunteer plants contaminating the next year's
food crops; 3) pollen drift contaminating nearby food crops; and 4) improperly
cleaned farm machinery or spilled seeds contaminating food crops. All four have
already occurred with experimental GM or biopharm crops, and unless steps are
taken, all surely will occur again.
Under the Plant Protection Act, USDA has responded piecemeal to well-
developed proposals upon which companies have already spent a great deal of
money. Under such circumstances, and constrained by its tenuous lines of authority,
USDA has not sufficiently considered overarching concerns. This regulatory hole is
undeniably attributable to the agency's hopelessly conflicted mission, but is made
worse by the absence of any laws directed specifically at regulating biotechnology.
The Framework's requirement that biotechnology be regulated under existing
law seriously hampers agency ability to propose and enforce needed rules.
Regulators have tried to cobble together a scheme by taking bits and pieces of a
whole series of laws drafted to confront other problems. In doing so, they have
already stretched existing laws almost beyond recognition, 250 and all for naught. The
regulatory scheme created by these contortions is simply not up to the task.
The status quo is unsafe and unacceptable. We must not wait for a tragedy
before taking the sensible steps that will ensure safe exploration of this technology.
We need laws and regulations that are directly on point. These laws must clarify the
government's authority to supervise earlier stages in the biopharm crop development
process in order to require biological containment measures. At least as important,
specific agencies need express delegations of clear regulatory responsibilities and
goals. 2 51 USDA has used tenuous lines of authority to make important and highly
politicized policy decisions about a technology on the frontiers of science. It has
made these decisions, moreover, with little or no scientific information, and in a
political climate strongly favoring technology. It is perhaps not surprising that,
under the circumstances, the agency has been wholly responsive rather than
proactive.
Without direct congressional action on this front, we can expect only more of
the same-the agency will continue to make post hoc approval decisions that do not,
and indeed cannot, incorporate some of the most serious concerns about this new
technology. The only way out of this conundrum is for Congress to take charge and
250 For example, FDA has expressed its intent to regulate transgenic salmon as an animal drug
under the FFDCA. Aside from the problem that this claim of regulatory authority contorts the
statutory language past all reasonable limits, this interpretation leaves gaping regulatory holes. For
example, it is unclear whether FDA has authority to consider ecosystem harms. See PEW INITIATIVE
ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, FUTURE FISH: ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC
FISH (2003), available at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/fish/ (examining the ambiguity
surrounding FDA's authority to consider environmental risks imposed by transgenic fish).
251 For different perspectives on the measures necessary to cure these regulatory ills, see
Marcia Ellen DeGeer, Comment: Can Roundup Ready TM Seeds Ever Be Corralled?: Restraining
Genetic Drift Through Criminal Sanctions, 29 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 255 (2003)
(arguing for use of criminal penalties to deter genetic drift); Thomas P. Redick, Biopharming,
Biosafety & Billion Dollar Debacles: Preventing Liability for Biotech Crops, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
115 (2003) (proposing contract based stewardship regime in lieu of new regulations). I respectfully
disagree and would suggest that, in light of the signal failure of criminal and tort regimes to prevent
contamination to date, they are a slender reed upon which to balance food safety and the fate of the
U.S. multi-billion dollar commodity export business.
402 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 30 NO. 2&3 2004
pass new laws directly addressing the problems surrounding biopharming. These
laws should recognize the unique nature of biopharmed crops and require
development of a special regulatory system devoted to the specific challenges posed
by the new technology. A statutory presumption against the use of food crops would
go a long way towards curing the flaws identified in this Article. This presumption
would not be irrebuttable, but could be overcome only upon a showing that use of
non-food crops is technically infeasible and that the public interest at stake is
important or compelling. The biopharm crop developer should have the burden of
proof on each of these points. Such a rule would permit biopharming in food crops
if it is truly in the public's interest, but would not permit private commercial
assessments of profitability to supplant significant public safety concerns.
The existing scheme leaves the public exposed and vulnerable. There is no way
to impose USDA's post hoc physical containment measures in a way that will
actually be protective of the public health without also creating a cost-prohibitive
and burdensome oversight system. And, even were USDA to actually institute such
a detailed and omnipresent system, physical containment simply cannot be done.
Cross-pollination will occur; farmers will fail to follow planting requirements; and
accidents will happen. Use of food crops for biopharming therefore guarantees that
at least low levels, and possibly significant quantities, of biopharmed proteins will
wind up in human foods. There is no Plan B, no backup means for decontaminating
the food supply. Indeed, once these crops are developed and marketed, the only
possible restrictions will be extremely costly to implement and none of them can
successfully protect the nation's food supply from contamination.252
V. CONCLUSION
Working within a regulatory framework largely unfettered by environmental or
health and safety considerations, it is perhaps not surprising that biotech developers
focused on corn as the most immediately cost-effective vehicle for their project.253
Corn is well characterized and the growing cycle is well understood.2 54  And, of
course, there is the influence of corn boards and lobbies. With few regulators raising
concerns about cross-fertilization and commingling, developers spent years and
large sums of money developing potential corn biopharm products. Now
agricultural economists pose the question "what is the most efficient level of
biosafety obtained for the cost of regulation incurred in the current system? '2 55 This
is not the proper question. The current regulatory system is not etched in stone.
This Article identifies a number of regulatory measures that would permit the
development of this technology while providing far more protection for the food
supply.
252 For example, the NRC unambiguously concluded that, with regard to producing human
monoclonal antibodies in plants, "[i]t would be essential to grow these plants in restricted locations,"
meaning isolated from food crops. COMMITTEE ON BIOBASED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, supra note 10,
at 228.
253 See, e.g., Giddings, supra note 164, at 1152-54 (noting that many biotech companies use
corn because of the economics of production).
254 RALPH E. NEILD & JAMES E. NEWMAN, NATIONAL CORN HANDBOOK: GROWING SEASON
CHARACTERISTICS AND REQUIREMENTS IN THE CORN BELT, at http://www.agcom.purdue.edu/AgCom/Pubs/
NCH/NCH-40.html (last visited June 26, 2004).
255 See, e.g., JOSE FALCK ZEPEDA ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY, BIOSAFETY, AND REGULATORY
COSTS, at http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/conferenze/icabr2003/abstract/ (linking to Public
Perception of Biotechnology) (last visited June 26,, 2004).
CONSUMING (F)EARS OF CORN
Decision-making about food safety necessarily entails balancing competing
values and interests,256 but irreversible tradeoffs of this magnitude ought not be
lightly made. It may be that the public is willing to accept this trade; the prospect of
inexpensive and plentiful therapeutics and plastics may be attractive enough to
accept the threat of contaminated food. But, such a fundamental and irrevocable
choice should be the product of a public discussion257 and decision-making
process, 25 8 not the byproduct of private economic ordering. While economic
efficiency is an important factor in regulation,259 there is an even more important
preliminary question that it seems was never asked: Are there directions of research
that should be categorically excluded from the beginning in order to ensure that the
fruits of the research can be grown without compromising the security of the food
supply?
Pressure finds the weakest spot. Had the biopharming developers been forced to
internalize these public health concerns during the development process, the
products now being readied for market would have confronted and solved the
problems, either through use of non-food crops as a production vehicle or through an
as-yet-undeveloped extensive and elaborate system of biological and geographic
safeguards like those detailed in this Article. The status quo would have been
protective. Instead, developers were free to build a status quo that did not include
consideration of these basic human health concerns.
When baseline protective measures are added after the fact, they are always too
little, too late. Even worse, the measures are viewed as changing a status quo and"adding" costs. All too often, these protective measures are considered regulatory
red tape26 0-unnecessary hurdles placed between developers and their just rewards
by an unresponsive and incompetent bureaucracy. Under those circumstances,
developers push for compromise on the measures intended to protect public health.
Let me be clear-there are real potential advantages to this technology. It could
provide a cost-effective means to produce desperately needed therapeutic proteins.
Plants are not known to harbor bacterial or viral pathogens that infect humans or
animals, which means that the purification risks are reduced.26' It is simply much
less likely that a human pathogen will accidentally contaminate a batch of plant-
256 For a general description of food safety decision-making, see Vern R. Walker, Some
Dangers of Taking Precautions Without Adopting the Precautionary Principle: A Critique of Food
Safety Regulation in the United States, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10040 (2001).
257 See Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy's Attempt to Turn Politics into Law,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (2002) (discussing the hurdles to having such a conversation).
258 For a discussion of how such decision-making could, or ought to take place, see DANIEL A.
FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD 39-42 (1999).
259 Cost benefit analyses are now de rigueur for almost all agency decision-making. See Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). As a tool, cost-benefit analysis can be
extremely informative. For questions like the ones posed in this Article, where the benefits are
inchoate and the risks are probabilistic, the tool of risk benefit analysis is too often distorted or
manipulated in the hands of ideologically or economically interested actors. For a recent critique of
what passes for reasoned analysis in the world of cost-benefit balancing, see Frank Ackerman & Liza
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L.
R. 1553 (2002).
260 For an point-by-point refutation of this portrayal, and an argument that regulation of GM crops
should be precautionary, See John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary
Principle to Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
207, 234 (2001).
261 Steven J. Streatfield et al., Plant Based Vaccines: Unique Advantages, 19 VACCINE 2742,
2747 (2001).
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grown pharmaceuticals. After the recent mad cow disease scare, this concern is a
262pressing one. Grains are also easy to transport and store. Finally, the technology
could ultimately result in needle-free vaccine delivery systems that do not require
refrigeration or the participation of trained medical professionals. 263  Thus,
biopharmed vaccines might be particularly suitable for use in the developing world,
and could make a reality of the dream of universal vaccination.
Without adequate safeguards, however, this technology poses imminent risks
that might dwarf those benefits. It all comes down to the fact that biopharmed corn
and other crops are emphatically not for consumption as food, but are
indistinguishable from crops intended for food. As such, biopharming really does
pose new and fundamental safety challenges. Answering those challenges will
require concentrated effort and significant investment from the regulatory agencies
and the regulated community. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest a real
commitment to building the sort of infrastructure needed to safely grow these crops.
The specter of StarLink corn and ProdiGene is hovering. The next violation may not
be caught in time, and the next crisis might not be so benign.
The integrity of the U.S. food supply is at stake. With a clear likelihood of
contamination and no evidence that these crops are safe to consume, even in low
levels, permitting commercial development of these products cannot be justified as
scientifically sound or as a reasonable assessment of the costs and benefits. And,
with the European Union, Japan, and Korea (our major grain commodity partners)
264establishing threshold tolerance levels for GM contamination, the U.S.
commodities export markets face potentially cataclysmic risks.
These failures to address the problem of contamination and commingling
become even more critical now that the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has entered
into force. 265 Article 10 of the Protocol gives states the power to refuse import of the
products of biotechnology in order to avoid or minimize adverse effects on human
health or the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.266 It is hard to
imagine anything more likely to trigger a refusal to import under the Cartagena
Protocol than undetectable commingling of industrial or pharmaceutical crops
containing non-food proteins with export food crops.
262 See, e.g., Chris Clayton, U.S. Cattle Industry Calls For Renewal of Ban on Canadian Beef
OMAHA WORLD HERALD, May 27, 2004.
263 Streatfield, supra note 261.
264 See Peter W.B. Phillips & Heather McNeill, A Survey of National Labeling Policies for GM
Foods, 3 J. AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON. 219 (2000), available at http://www.agbioforum.org/
v3n4/v3n4a07-phillipsmcneill.htm#T l.
265 CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY, supra note 32.
266 id. at art. 10.
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